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- United States Policy in Southern Africa—*Pauline H. Baker* 193
- South Africa: Coercion and Demands for Change—*Kenneth W. Grundy* 197
- Nigeria Between Dictatorship and Democracy—*Larry Diamond* 201
- Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism—*Jon Kraus* 205
- Kenya: The Dissolution of Democracy—*Michael Paul Maren* 209
- Mozambique and the Regional Conflict in Southern Africa—*Allen Isaacman* 213
- The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon—*Mario Azevedo* 217

- Book Reviews—*On Africa* 221
- The Month in Review—*Country by Country, Day by Day* 235
- Map—*Africa*—Inside Back Cover

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Current History

MAY, 1987

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The continuing violence in southern Africa, United States policies in that region, and the revolutionary and military governments of some African nations are discussed here. Our introductory article points out that, "By abandoning diplomacy for military intervention, the United States [has] entirely recast its policy in southern Africa, killing any chance of acting as an honest broker."

United States Policy in Southern Africa

BY PAULINE H. BAKER

Senior Associate, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

IT is difficult to think of a time when United States policy toward southern Africa has been more confused than it is today. As the recent report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa confirmed, "constructive engagement," as President Ronald Reagan's southern Africa policy came to be known, "has failed."¹ None of its central objectives—to achieve a settlement in Namibia, to remove Cuban troops from Angola, to enhance regional security and eliminate apartheid—have been achieved. Moreover, United States credibility in the region is at an all-time low, relations with key states in the region are strained, and the American debate has become polarized over conflicting views of fundamental United States objectives—this despite Secretary of State George Shultz's warning two years ago that

We simply cannot afford to let southern Africa become a divisive domestic issue, tearing our country apart, rendering our actions haphazard and impotent, and contributing to the ugliest and most violent outcome.²

In the opinion of the Advisory Committee, the issue of sanctions "should be considered resolved by the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986." Regrettably, that is not the case. The sanctions debate is not over, and broader issues of American policy toward southern Africa are coming to the fore. Ironically, the triumph represented by the bipartisan consensus over South African sanctions is being over-

shadowed by disarray and division over competing goals in southern Africa at large.

Originally praised for its coherence and promise, constructive engagement was a carefully developed strategy conceived by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, who used the administration's wider geostrategic outlook to advance regional goals.³ Through quiet diplomacy, the policy was intended to blunt Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa by promoting a process of dialogue and reconciliation between South Africa and the independent black-ruled states in the region that provided sanctuary to the African National Congress (ANC), the liberation movement fighting for majority rule. By addressing Pretoria's security concerns, it was argued, the government of President Pieter W. Botha could be coaxed into agreeing to an international settlement in Namibia, détente with its neighbors, and internal change that would address the fundamental political concerns of its black population.

During the first term of the administration of President Ronald Reagan, Crocker focused on the question of Namibia, a contested territory ruled by South Africa since World War I and the site of a 20-year insurgency that has claimed over 10,000 lives. Crocker sought a diplomatic settlement that would link independence in Namibia with the removal of Cuban forces from Angola, a strategy that underscored common strategic interests with Pretoria, shifted the burden of responsibility for a settlement to Angola, and diverted attention from the issue of apartheid.

New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis summed up popular expectations of the approach in 1981. While he described Ronald Reagan's general foreign policy

¹"A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1987).

²Quoted in Flora Lewis, "Consensus on Pretoria?" *The New York Times*, April 19, 1985.

³Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1980-1981.

as "highly declamatory so far," the policy in southern Africa, he observed, "raises real possibilities for exploring ways to resolve long-festering problems." Crocker's strategy, he continued,

indicates a willingness to talk with all parties, and by implication [demonstrates] a preference for diplomatic solutions. . . . I . . . think that there is a chance for a Namibian-Angolan settlement—and that this Administration is in a good position to bring it off.⁴

For years, the Reagan administration pursued this approach without much public scrutiny. But by 1984, things started going awry. Several deadlines for achieving a Namibian settlement had passed; Pretoria became openly aggressive against its neighbors; and waves of antiapartheid violence and opposition of unprecedented scope and duration broke out within South Africa itself.

The unraveling of constructive engagement came, curiously, shortly after the signing of a security pact between Mozambique and South Africa in March, 1984, an event that was considered the high-water mark of the policy. Midwived by the United States, this agreement—known as the Nkomati Accord—was heralded as a breakthrough in southern Africa that would stop the spiral of violence. But revelations of South African violations through continuing aid to the rebel Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR or RENAMO) exposed the fragility of the accord, dashed hopes for regional reconciliation, and undermined the administration's claims of progress.

Southern Africa became the first major foreign policy defeat of Ronald Reagan's second term. Constructive engagement came under severe attack from both the right and the left; public dissatisfaction reached a crescendo of bipartisan opposition in 1986, resulting in a unique congressional coalition of Republican and Democratic support for sanctions against South Africa. The debate became the central focus of American attention in the region and the sanctions legislation, enacted in October, precipitated a sharp shift in United States relations with South Africa.

The law was not only a watershed for United States policy in Africa, but a unique example of public opinion repudiating a popular President on an international issue during peacetime. Passed by comfortable margins in both houses of Congress, which overrode the President's veto, the legislation ensured that South Africa would be a dominant issue on the American foreign policy agenda and a major public issue for years to come.

The passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 also had a strong domestic component; it was as much a repudiation of constructive engagement as a rejection of apartheid. However, by dis-

crediting the premises of the policy, Congress exposed deep divisions in American public opinion about what to do next. Constructive engagement is no longer a viable policy; but in the absence of a coherent framework to replace it, what remains is a fragmented collection of legislative restrictions, ideological rigidities and diplomatic frustrations.

In principle, Washington is still trying to enlist the cooperation of Angola on a Namibian settlement, but in practice it is subverting that goal by arming rebels trying to overthrow the government in Luanda. Washington is also encouraging Mozambique to sustain its security pact with South Africa but has watched Pretoria violate it with impunity. Washington wants to pressure Pretoria to dismantle apartheid but has strengthened its strategic ties with the white regime including, according to news reports, persuading the government to deliver arms to the contras in Central America. Not surprisingly, the United States has alienated and confused most African leaders—black and white, liberal and conservative, Marxist and non-Marxist—and Washington's regional influence is dwindling rapidly.

REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION

In the history of United States policy toward southern Africa, 1986 will be remembered as the year Washington imposed meaningful sanctions against Pretoria. While that issue consumed the lion's share of attention for Americans, other regional trends highlighted the limitations of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy when divorced from diplomacy, aid and the wider regional context in which the South African drama is taking place.

The first major trend was heightened South African aggression against South Africa's neighbors. Since 1981, Pretoria had invaded Angola, aided antigovernment rebels, launched lightning strikes against ANC targets in other countries and engaged in economic harassment to assert its will in the region. But new levels of aggression were evident in 1986.

In January, South Africa imposed severe sanctions against Lesotho, a tiny enclave state entirely surrounded by South Africa. Claiming that it was acting in response to a buildup of ANC guerrillas, Pretoria slapped a near-total embargo on the country, allowing only migrant workers traveling to South African mines to cross the border. Lesotho's officials claimed that South Africa was punishing them for having complained to the United Nations about South Africa's December, 1985, raid on Maseru, Lesotho's capital, which killed nine people, six of them ANC refugees. Two weeks after Pretoria's embargo, hundreds of Lesotho's troops surrounded the offices of the Prime Minister and staged a military coup that installed a new government under General Justin Lekhanya, who was willing to conclude security arrangements on Pretoria's terms.

⁴Anthony Lewis, "Exploring Africa Policy," *The New York Times*, April 5, 1981.

On May 19, South African ground and air forces launched a three-pronged assault on alleged guerrilla strongholds in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia, the most spectacular and far-reaching military operation in Pretoria's 25-year war against the ANC. Earlier raids had been limited to one country at a time and had not hit targets in Zambia or Zimbabwe. The attacks had no real military significance, but three people were killed, none of them of South African origin. The political fallout was extensive. The raids provoked unprecedented international outrage, wrecked a Commonwealth peace initiative by a delegation known as the Eminent Persons Group, which appeared to be on the verge of making specific peace proposals, and caused the Reagan administration to react in uncharacteristic anger. The United States strongly condemned the attacks, recalled its military attaché to Pretoria and expelled his South African counterpart in Washington. Secretary Shultz stated that the attack was "totally without justification and is completely unacceptable," the toughest language the Reagan administration has ever used against Pretoria.

The attacks also strengthened the international campaign for economic sanctions and served notice of a hardening of Pretoria's attitudes. In August, a summit of seven Commonwealth heads of state agreed, with the exception of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, to impose limited economic sanctions as laid out by the Commonwealth's 1985 Nassau Accord. South Africa announced that it "would not take this lying down." Pretoria applied "demonstration sanctions," slowing imports from Zambia and Zimbabwe, two key trading partners. Pretoria also ordered meticulous inspections of goods at border crossings, instituted a new licensing system for exports, and required a deposit on goods moving through its ports.

Approximately 85 percent of the imports and exports of the six nations known as the front-line states (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania and Botswana) go through South Africa. Regulatory restrictions like these, or a cutoff of strategic outlets to the sea, could cripple their fragile economies by shutting down their capacity to trade. This extreme economic dependency, as well as vulnerability to Pretoria's overwhelming military dominance, threatens not only states that have historically provided ANC sanctuaries, like Mozambique, but countries that have rigorously avoided entanglements with the ANC, like Botswana, a multiracial parliamentary democracy. Yet Botswana was severely shaken by the armed strikes last year of South African commandos and is also a victim of economic harassment. Even Zaire, a close trading partner of South Africa's, recognizes Preto-

ria's stranglehold on the area. The search for an alternative to South African railways is a major preoccupation of the region.

A SHIFT IN THE UNITED STATES ROLE

In addition to Pretoria's heightened international aggression, a second major development was a shift in the role of the United States—from mediation to militancy. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a rebel group fighting to overthrow the Soviet- and Cuban-backed government of Angola, received red-carpet treatment in Washington during his visit to the United States in January and February, 1986. Backed principally by South Africa, Savimbi had been cut off from American assistance in 1975 with the enactment of the so-called Clark Amendment, a congressional prohibition on military involvement in Angola that was repealed in 1985 at the urging of the Reagan administration.

Hailed as an anti-Communist "freedom-fighter" by top United States conservatives, including President Reagan (who met him in the Oval Office), this previously little-known figure received wide media exposure during a public relations blitz coordinated by the Heritage Foundation and the lobbying firm of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, Inc. On February 18, the Reagan administration confirmed that it was going ahead with a \$15-million program of covert military assistance to Savimbi. In response, Angola's official radio announced that the United States decision to provide arms to Savimbi amounted to a declaration of war against the Luanda government and accused Washington of entering into a strategic alliance with South Africa.

Aid to UNITA doomed the Namibian initiative, the central goal of the Reagan administration's Africa policy. South African President Botha subsequently caused a flurry of diplomatic speculation on March 4 by proposing August 1, 1986, as a new deadline to implement UN Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia. Actually, the setting of that date marked the end of 10 years of United States-led diplomacy. Pretoria had suggested the date only because the United States had asked it to do so in a last-ditch attempt to rescue the talks by the appearance of a fresh offer.⁵ In fact, the terms of the agreement, notably the insistence on the prior removal of Cuban troops from Angola, remained intact. By September, United States aid to UNITA was well in place and Savimbi bragged that American-supplied Stinger missiles had been used to shoot down 10 Soviet-built Angolan government aircraft, including jets, helicopter gunships and a troop transport in heavy skirmishing over the previous two months.

The failure to reach a settlement on Namibia did not in itself represent a major foreign policy defeat for

⁵Pauline H. Baker, "Deadlock in Namibia—and a Shift in U.S. Policy," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1986.

the United States, which has no vital interests at stake in the territory. But the hopes of the Reagan administration to get Cuban troops out of Angola were shattered. Luanda has confirmed that all links between it and the two main countries funding UNITA remain broken.

By abandoning diplomacy for military intervention, the United States entirely recast its policy in southern Africa, killing any chance of acting as an honest broker. Military aid to UNITA is seen throughout the area as evidence of Washington's support of South Africa in regional conflicts in the name of anti-communism.

September was the month when contradictions in American policy were put on record. In a little-noticed move on September 17, the United States House of Representatives refused to cut off the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert military aid program for Savimbi. Two weeks later, the House voted to override President Reagan's veto of economic sanctions against South Africa. Taken together, these votes pointed the United States in diametrically opposite directions, signaling moral opposition to and strategic support for the apartheid state.

GROWING VIOLENCE

The third major trend in the region during the year was increased violence and repression, especially within South Africa. According to the Detainees' Parents Support Committee, an independent South African human rights group, at least 29,000 people were detained by the government during 1986, including 10,000 children 18 years old or younger. About 75 percent of the detainees were affiliated with organizations linked to the United Democratic Front (UDF), the largest multiracial opposition in South Africa, which was singled out by the security forces when Pretoria declared a nationwide state of emergency in June and launched the biggest crackdown on dissidents in its history.

Pretoria maintains that the unrest has significantly diminished since the emergency was declared, but there is no way of independently verifying that claim. No unauthorized news on political violence is allowed to be reported by the severely censored media.

The official death rate for the period from June, 1986, to January, 1987, was "about 400," against 2,300 in the previous two years of revolt. But even that figure reveals only a modest reduction in the death rate, from approximately 100 a month from 1984 to mid-1986, to approximately 70 a month for the last half of that year.⁶ The South African Institute of Race Rela-

tions said that at least 1,298 people died in political violence during 1986, or over 100 a month, but the number might be even higher because of the difficulty of collecting data since the imposition of restrictions on the press. In addition, Pretoria's Institute of Strategic Studies reported 228 guerrilla attacks during the first 11 months of 1986, compared to 136 in all of 1985, and 44 in 1984.⁷

Violence elsewhere in the region also intensified. Fueled by American and Soviet-bloc arms, the 12-year-old war in Angola appears far from resolution and is causing extensive casualties, particularly civilians maimed by antipersonnel mines planted by UNITA in the countryside. Luanda, it has been said, is now the amputee capital of the world.

Mozambique's economically strapped government is facing growing threats from RENAMO in a 10-year struggle that has wasted the country, demolished its infrastructure, displaced as many as a million people and caused a famine. According to official Mozambican figures, the insurgency has caused \$5 billion in damage and has taken 100,000 lives.

Operating in all 10 provinces of the country, RENAMO was initially started by the white Rhodesian government to harass the black nationalist Rhodesian guerrillas based in Mozambique before Zimbabwe's independence. In 1980, RENAMO came under the protective wing of South Africa and hopes to follow in the footsteps of UNITA, becoming another candidate for American aid as an organization of anti-Communist "freedom fighters." RENAMO has opened an office in Washington at the headquarters of the Heritage Foundation.

One of the poorest countries in the world, Mozambique suffered an additional blow with the death of its charismatic President, Samora Machel, in October, 1986, when his Soviet-piloted aircraft crashed in South Africa. Pretoria was accused of being responsible, but thus far has not been proved to be at fault.

The Mozambican insurgency threatens other landlocked states in southern Africa, particularly Zimbabwe and Zambia, because RENAMO targets vital regional trade routes. Especially vulnerable is the 190-mile Beira Corridor, a rail, road and oil pipeline. The rehabilitation and defense of the Beira Corridor is a

(Continued on page 225)

Pauline H. Baker was a professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with principal responsibility for Africa from 1977 to 1981. She lived in Nigeria for 11 years, teaching at the University of Lagos, and has focused on southern Africa since she conducted research on South African foreign policy as a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow in 1975-1976. She is the author of several books and articles, including a forthcoming publication by the Ford Foundation on changing United States-South African relations.

⁶*The New York Times*, February 3, 1987. *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), February 13-19, 1987.

⁷Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Africa and the Middle East* (hereafter FBIS), January 16, 1987, and February 24, 1987.

"The struggle for South Africa looks more and more like a frontal contest between the militant forces of resistance and revolution and the mobilized and unbending armed forces of the status quo. . . . South Africa is perilously near the slippery slope of full-scale violence. . . ."

South Africa: Coercion and Demands for Change

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University

BECAUSE of the current high levels of violence and coercion, security is South Africa's preeminent preoccupation. The government is doing all it can to restabilize or reassert its control over the polity—short of a full-scale war on its opponents, the abdication of power, or a major reform leading to a transition to black rule.

Political divisions among whites center on how to deal with the black resistance. Divisions in the black community focus on how to conduct the struggle for change. Even South Africa's foreign policy is increasingly an adjunct to its domestic struggle for order.¹

Despite the government's initiatives and its use of force, there is growing resistance to minority rule. By virtually all measures of unrest—deaths, beatings and acts of intimidation, strikes, "incidents," protest actions, guerrilla or "terrorist" activity, the spread of weapons, security force deployment, detentions and arrests, emigration, forced removals, bannings and restriction orders, new and more repressive laws and regulations—the tension mounts.² Life has changed for the black residents of townships and homelands; buffeted by the major contestants, who insist that they take sides and conform, they are left without physical protection. Yet the authorities still see the situation as manageable, although they have not figured out how to maintain control.

¹See Kenneth W. Grundy, "Regional Coercion for Domestic Domination: South Africa's Militarization at Home and Abroad" (Paper presented to the conference on Militarization in the Third World, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January 15–17, 1987).

²*Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg) regularly publishes an "Apartheid Barometer" of data on the security situation.

³Eugene Terre' Blanche quoted in *The Star* (Johannesburg) (weekly air edition), June 2, 1986, p. 15.

⁴*The Star* (weekly air edition), June 23, 1986, p. 15. Empirical data from South Africa, especially survey data, must be regarded with suspicion. They are offered here only for lack of more reliable information about public opinion.

⁵Mark Orkin, *Disinvestment, the Struggle, and the Future: What Black South Africans Really Think* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), p. 50. Orkin's study was prepared for the Community Agency for Social Inquiry with the Institute for Black Research.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 33.

Meanwhile, virtually all segments of society have come to accept the view that their lives and fortunes are a product of the manipulation of coercion. They see their problems at base as issues of power, which they narrowly define in coercive terms.

A form of Gresham's law of militarism applies: the cooperative, negotiable and compromisable are driven out by the violent and assertive. Moderation and tolerance are in retreat. When people expect violence to "settle" conflicts, then they prepare for violence. Spokespersons for virtually every political group and faction have expressed themselves in bellicose terms. The African National Congress (ANC) talks of "people's war." The South African Defence Force (SADF) says it has not yet begun to use its muscle. The extreme right wing shouts: "Touch the Boer nation and we'll blast you until you are level with the ground!"³ Leaders in neighboring states likewise prepare for the worst; and even those who claim to favor nonviolence are forced to defend themselves.

Public opinion polls demonstrate that people have adopted this frame of mind. An early 1986 survey of white opinion indicated that 71.1 percent of the whites think that a Namibian-type guerrilla war will eventually develop in South Africa.⁴ In a similar 1984 survey, 62.8 percent shared that opinion. Nor are whites convinced that the SADF can maintain its control. Only 26 percent "definitely agreed" that the unrest can be contained indefinitely. Some two-thirds of those interviewed felt some confidence in the security forces. Only 28.5 percent of the white respondents felt that "South Africa's blacks have a good reason to take up arms against the Government"; the percentages were even lower among National party (NP) supporters and those to its right.

In a related but not comparable 1985 survey among urban blacks, 80 percent of the respondents agreed that "compromise is no longer possible; . . . the next step must be a unitary arrangement in which all blacks and whites together vote for their leaders, to participate without regard to race or group in one central government."⁵ Because they demand what the white government is pledged to prevent, 36 percent favored armed struggle against the government.⁶

The government has responded to this challenge in two ways—one relatively subtle, the other crude. First, the government has sought to identify and engage what it calls “moderate” blacks in the administrative and enforcement process. In the same vein, the government has sought to initiate reform of the obviously unacceptable apartheid system. Homeland officials, “elected” township councillors, the black business community, government employees, particularly the security and education establishments, mixed race (Coloured) and Indian members of Parliament, and some conservative church leaders have been enlisted in the effort to restabilize the country. To entice them into this risky association requires that the government make concessions that might defuse the tension or win over those not committed to revolution.

Of course, the government is under pressure from its own white constituents not to weaken their ultimate grip on the country. So the government enacts minimal reforms, hoping that each step toward “power sharing” will enable it to tamp down the resistance. To date, the government has not hit upon a remotely effective formula. There is plenty of speculation about how far the government is prepared to go to change the apartheid system. This speculation itself neutralizes some fence hangers who think that the government may yet dismantle apartheid piecemeal and peacefully. Some of the celebrated reform measures of the last few years—the tricameral (white, Coloured and Indian) Parliament, the introduction of various “elected” local governing bodies, the end to “influx control” and the hated pass laws, the promise to end “forced removals,” the repeal of the prohibition on mixed marriages, the restoration of South African citizenship to some eight million blacks who were deprived of citizenship when “independence” was conferred on their homelands—have achieved little black support for the regime. What little support the reform strategy once enjoyed seems to have been dissipated in recent months.

The second element of the government’s policy is the effort to display its resolve to reestablish order, even if this requires a full panoply of coercive and violent measures. Simply put, the NP government seems determined to do what it thinks it needs to do

to retain power. Perhaps the government felt that it had things well in hand in February, 1986, when it lifted the partial state of emergency that had been in force in specified “unrest areas.” But resistance groups seemed to take heart. Although they had suffered under the emergency and many of their leaders had been detained, affiliated organizations of the United Democratic Front (UDF) behaved as if they had taken the government’s best punch and remained standing.

A variety of organizations, especially youth groups, used the ending of the emergency to mobilize. They turned funerals into political theater, claimed the townships as theirs, and openly set up people’s parks, people’s courts and “liberated zones” in the townships. In fact, the security forces were still at hand. The authorities reasserted dominance on June 12 (just 4 days before the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising). The government issued a second state of emergency, this time for the entire country. This emergency was altogether different. “We’re not kidding,” warned the Bureau for Information. Detention sweeps were comprehensive and efficient. Some 20,000 people were apprehended in the first four months. The security force presence in the townships was expanded. Any sign of resistance was squelched.

New press regulations were pronounced; many critics were silenced; and intra-black violence was promoted. At first, the emergency and its rigorous enforcement seemed to work. The killing rate fell sharply, from 6.31 per day when the emergency had been lifted, to 2.27 after the full-scale emergency had been declared. In that sense the emergency “worked.”⁷

EMERGENCY

Eventually, the regime’s opponents recovered. Emergency II did not really restore peace. It managed to suppress some street violence temporarily. Uncoordinated, anomic violence was replaced by the violence of vigilante bands hostile to the resisters and supported by the authorities.⁸ Emergency II has given the government the upper hand, but official (and some unofficial) regime violence has replaced revolutionary violence.

It is extremely difficult to find out what is happening. Media constraints enable the government to shield South Africans and the outside world from the realities. For example, in December, 1986, “official data” suggested that 1,831 people had been killed in the unrest since September, 1984. A conservative report by the South African Institute of Race Relations puts the figure at 2,291. Other estimates are higher. Similar discrepancies apply to other quantitative data and to accounts of events.

As the law stands, the news media, including foreign correspondents, are not allowed to publish unauthorized accounts and commentary on civil unrest and on the protests against apartheid.⁹ It is a crime to

⁷*Weekly Mail*, vol. 2, no. 50 (December 19, 1986–January 8, 1987), pp. 7–8.

⁸Nicholas Haysom, *Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986); and Jeremy Seekings, “Vigilantes and the State,” *Work in Progress* (Johannesburg), no. 40 (February, 1986), pp. 26–29.

⁹See the revealing article by Jo-Ann Bekker, “An Illustrated Guide to Public Ignorance,” which tries to demonstrate the effects of changing censorship regulations on the press from 1980 to 1987, in the *Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 5 (February 6–12, 1987), pp. 14–15. See also the *Weekly Mail*, vol. 2, no. 49 (December 12–18, 1986), pp. 1 and 3.

criticize the government's handling of the political crisis. All reports of violence, strikes, boycotts and protest meetings, except for official accounts, must be submitted to the Bureau for Information for "clearance," that is, prior censorship. Individuals who make "subversive statements," very broadly defined even in private communication, are subject to prosecution.

Remarks that "discredit or undermine compulsory military service," for instance, are "subversive." Additional controls on the media make journalism a risky profession. These controls are so rigid that even the opposition political parties that work within the parliamentary system have complained that their candidates for the May, 1987, elections cannot discuss the issues fully nor can they campaign without possibly violating the law. In their eyes, they are "gagged."

THE FLUIDITY OF BLACK POLITICS

The government clampdown has severely divided the black community. This is not because many blacks sympathize with the government, but because they disagree on how best to counter the government's moves, or because they are too frightened to carry the struggle further. Certain patterns of political change are apparent.

First is the growing legitimacy of the African National Congress (ANC) among the black populace and in the outside world.¹⁰ ANC officers held official meetings with top British and United States executive branch personnel in 1986 and 1987, including a controversial session between United States Secretary of State George Shultz and Oliver Tambo, the ANC president. At each stage of the mounting resistance, the government accuses the ANC of coordinating the protests and brands the resistance as foreign controlled. And by its acts, the government focuses attention on the ANC. For example, the May, 1986, government raids on ANC facilities in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the publicity associated with these raids played into the ANC's hands.

To be sure, the number of armed attacks within South Africa attributed to the ANC has risen steadily. Yet it would be wrong to argue that the dominant thrust of ANC policy is the escalation of violence. The ANC's strategy of "people's war" is a protracted struggle embracing all forms of action. Structural order is a must, and political activity—including mass resistance and armed strikes—requires that forces and underground political machinery be built up over time. The ANC also seeks to build unity among all segments of the black community.

At every turn, the government accuses the ANC of

directing a unified struggle and threatens to leave no stone unturned in rooting out its leaders. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the progressive opposition in Parliament, put it accurately: "It is not the external ANC that is radicalizing the internal situation. It is the internal situation that is radicalizing the ANC."¹¹

Domestically, the popularity, vitality and staying power of the United Democratic Front are apparent. The UDF is South Africa's largest antiapartheid coalition, an umbrella body with around 850 affiliated organizations that boast 2.5 million members. Yet the UDF is hard hit by the tightened security. Despite its commitment to nonviolence, virtually its entire top national and regional leadership is in jail or in hiding. In addition, the UDF has been designated an "affected organization," thereby barring it from overseas funding and placing additional restraints on its operations. Yet the UDF carries on, with thousands of covert yet nonviolent activists in the affiliates. The state insists that the UDF is a wolf in sheep's clothing, holding that it is the internal agent of the banned ANC. So far, the government has not been able to prove that charge in an appellate court.

An interesting but probably stillborn experiment to bridge the impasse is being played out in Natal province. There, after 8 weeks of hard bargaining, an agreement was reached by 24 of the 37 delegations to an *Indaba*, a high-level conference. Participants are seeking a multiracial, regional government for Natal and the black homeland of KwaZulu. The innovative set of proposals includes a bicameral legislature—a 100-member lower chamber elected on the basis of one person, one vote by proportional representation, and a 50-member upper chamber with 10 seats each for black Africans, Indians, Afrikaners and English-speakers and 10 seats for people who do not wish to be classified racially or culturally. The proposals include an executive branch that includes majority and minority parties and a division of powers between the KwaNatal government and Pretoria.

Experimentation may be necessary to save South Africa, but the plan was quickly rejected by the Natal leader of the NP. It did not, he said, provide for "effective and equal powersharing."¹² Later, at the opening of Parliament in 1987, the state President offered a more definitive rejection of the plan.

The *Indaba* was probably doomed from the start. The major forces in the struggle for South Africa, Afrikaner nationalism and radical black nationalism, were not party to the agreement. They refused to participate, although the NP opted for observer status. The constellation of radical black organizations—ANC, UDF, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the black consciousness groups—rejected invitations from the outset. They regard the *Indaba* as a maneuver to prolong white control by bringing in the Zulu-based Inkatha

¹⁰See the *Washington Post*, December 14, 1986.

¹¹*Hansard Debates* (House of Assembly), February 7, 1986, col. 419.

¹²*Weekly Mail*, vol. 2, no. 48 (December 5–11, 1986), pp. 12–13.

movement of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Indian "collaborators." The Afrikaner cultural and commercial organizations that participated in the *Indaba* either refused to sign the agreement or abstained. Presumably, they retain the long-standing Afrikaner concern that English-speaking whites might enfranchise the blacks and then ally with them to end Afrikaner domination.

Despite the enthusiasm for the *Indaba* plan among liberal South Africans and some conservative Americans, and the effort to market the plan as a "moderate," "centrist" first step approach to change, the plan is predicated on racial identity and is not non-racial. Thus the black majority (except for the Zulu leadership) sees it as a scheme to evade majority rule in a unitary South Africa.

Far more pernicious is the government's attempt to divide and play on fears within the black community by setting black against black. One such effort was the formation beginning early in 1985 of armed police forces under the authority of the black township councils. These forces are partisan instruments supporting established black township factions. Regarded as "collaborators" by regime opponents, they nonetheless offer insecure black officials a measure of legal muscle to wage war on their political enemies.

VIGILANTE VIOLENCE

Additional muscle has emerged in the form of the increasingly open activities of black vigilante groups.¹³ Much of what the media call "black-on-black" conflict is, in fact, the extra-legal violence of right-wing vigilantes. The ties between these groups and the structures of apartheid, especially the security forces, are lost in the sensationalist coverage. Although there is some factional and tribal strife, the designation of "black-on-black" is by itself misleading.

According to Nicholas Haysom, although vigilante groups display specific local characteristics, they share several common features. First, in most cases they emerged late in 1985. Second, they target almost exclusively the opponents of apartheid and homeland rule. Third, they operate brazenly, with what many (including the vigilantes themselves) regard as police support and the blessing if not the support of the regime's local black authorities.

Vigilantes are mobilized against the background of the collapse of existing administrative and "elected" structures in urban townships and the emergence of pockets of resistance to homeland rule. Official security forces in many instances have proved to be counterproductive. Official coercion contributes to social solidarity and opposition to community councils.

¹³See Haysom, op. cit.

¹⁴See Chris Vick, "The Improbable Allies and the Impassive Foe," *Weekly Mail*, vol. 3, no. 3 (January 23-29, 1987), p. 9.

In some instances, vigilantes have proved more effective in dealing with popular protest, and the government can claim innocence when blacks are killed. Unlike regime violence, which is often indiscriminate and random, vigilante violence is specific and focused, targeting those identified with opposition groups. Vigilantes also play on local fears and disenchantment with life's disruptions and sometimes the indiscipline of the township youths. Some township residents believe it is in their interest to support the vigilantes.

The much publicized "battle for Crossroads," the gigantic squatter settlement outside Cape Town, is one example. Between 60,000 and 70,000 people were left homeless and their entire settlement was razed in two days of intensive fighting. Bands of armed vigilantes, the so-called "witdoeke" (white scarves), allegedly with the aid of the police and the SADF, routed the more radical and antigovernment "comrades" from those areas of Crossroads where they held sway. It was "the fastest and cheapest forced removal" ever. Black fighters achieved what government bulldozers had failed to do. People fled, and today Crossroads is being rebuilt according to the state plans so long resisted by the residents. Approximately 25,000 "original settlers" will be allowed to stay—the rest are being forced to move to Khayelitsha, a township some 30 kilometers from Cape Town.

Divisions in the black community are also exacerbated in complex homeland political contests. In KwaNdebele, for instance, the bloody struggle over "independence" came in the form of factions within the Legislative Assembly and the use of a feared vigilante group, the Imbhokoto, associated with the KwaNdebele minister of home affairs.¹⁴ The political struggle is complicated, involving two senior or royal houses of the Ndebele, business and farming interests (including white farmers), non-Ndebele residents in KwaNdebele, plus the interests of the Pretoria government. After more than 100 deaths, including high-level assassinations, and much property destruction, the Assembly voted in August to rescind a 1982 unanimous decision to accept "independence" from South Africa.

In sum, nearly every feature of local and regional black politics is infused with confusing and diverse interests. It is not always a simple black against black contest. And Pretoria relishes these divisions and uses

(Continued on page 224)

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"The democratic transition to which President Babangida has committed himself reflects the pluralistic character and liberal aspirations of the country, and would seem for now to be difficult to reverse. But as with most other transitions in which the military leaves by its own choice and timetable, its completion is far from guaranteed and the success of any future democratic system is far from assured."

Nigeria Between Dictatorship and Democracy

BY LARRY DIAMOND

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SINCE the coup that toppled the Second Republic on December 31, 1983, Nigeria has been struggling to extricate itself from profound political and economic crises that have dramatically shaken the confidence and threatened the future of this once so promising giant of Africa. The failure of the second attempt at democratic government since independence in 1960 has left the country torn between a deep philosophical commitment to democracy and a tremendous revulsion with the corruption, violence and self-interestedness that have attended party politics in Nigeria.

At the same time, the depression in the world oil market has sucked the breath from an economic boom that had never matured beyond dependence on that one volatile, nonrenewable commodity. Saddled with a swollen and overbearing state sector that has obstructed private entrepreneurship, and with the massive international debts and ravaged currency that the politicians left as the legacy of their orgy of accumulation, the economy has been forced to endure sweeping and painful retrenchment and restructuring. Both politically and economically, Nigeria's second military interregnum has been a time of searching self-examination and agonizing adjustment.

The coup that returned the military to power at the end of 1983 was broadly welcomed and even joyously celebrated around the country. The democratic system had failed even to deliver political democracy, through free and fair elections, much less to produce some semblance of economic order and progress. When the coup finally came—after months of anxious and even prayerful anticipation by the people—there was something of a national consensus on the immediate imperatives of government. The economic mess had urgently to be sorted out, and order had to be restored to a system so plundered and mismanaged that teachers and civil servants in many states had gone without

pay for months. Political corruption had to be painstakingly investigated and—for the first time—seriously and systematically punished, not only as a matter of immediate justice, but to establish a legacy of accountability that would deter such venality. Beyond these concrete measures a more general kind of moral rejuvenation was needed—"discipline" was the word most often heard—to purge the cynical, grasping, rude and avaricious demeanor that seemed to have infected every dimension of social, economic and political life.¹

The government of the new head of state, Major General Muhammadu Buhari, and his second in command, Major General Tunde Idiagbon, seemed well suited to these objectives. These no-nonsense officers captured perfectly the early public disgust with the politicians. Their government moved quickly to punish corruption and eliminate waste. More than 300 top officials in the civil service, police and customs were dismissed or retired. Hundreds of former politicians were detained, including former President Shehu Shagari, his Vice President, Alex Ekwueme, most of the state governors, and many state and federal ministers and legislators. Huge sums of cash were seized from the homes of leading politicians, and the accounts of detained and fugitive politicians were frozen. Imports and travel allowances were slashed, black-market currency operations were raided and government contracts were placed under review.

These initial moves were highly popular, especially with the interest groups—students, trade unions, businessmen and professionals—that had been most disgusted with the civilian regime. Newspapers and intellectuals also supported the professed intention of the new regime to restore accountability to public life. But it soon became apparent that the Buhari regime viewed accountability only in retrospective terms and as a process to be ordered and managed tightly from above. In fact, with unprecedented harshness, arrogance and impunity, the Buhari regime turned on the constituencies that had cheered its arrival.

Political problems crystallized in March, 1984, with the announcement of several controversial, authoritarian decrees. Decree Number 3 provided for mili-

¹For more background on the causes of the 1983 military coup, see Larry Diamond, "Nigeria in Search of Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 4 (Spring, 1984), and Richard Joseph, "The Overthrow of Nigeria's Second Republic," *Current History*, March, 1984.

tary tribunals to try former public officials suspected of corruption and misconduct in office. While the concept of such trials was popular, protest arose over the uniform severity of the penalties (a minimum of 21 years in prison) and in particular the militaristic procedures, which placed the "onus of proving" innocence on the accused, prohibited appeal of the verdict, closed the proceedings to the public, and put the military essentially in charge of the legal process. These provisions led the Nigerian Bar Association to boycott the trials.

In the following year, Nigerians were gratified to see the conviction and sentencing of many of the country's most notoriously corrupt politicians, including former governors from a majority of the 19 states, and several prominent ministers, including the former federal minister of finance. In addition, acquittals of some less well-known individuals suggested that the tribunals were capable of fair and independent verdicts. But concern mounted over the continued detention without trial of a number of politicians who had not been formally charged, and over the dearth of convictions of the most powerful kingpins of the former ruling party (the National party of Nigeria), especially those from the NPN's northern, Muslim power base. Given in addition the heavily northern, Muslim composition of the Supreme Military Council, the Buhari regime was increasingly derided as "the military wing of the NPN."

The disenchantment was fed not only by the narrow ethnic and political base of the regime, but also by its increasing repressiveness, as manifested in its assault on the press. Decree Number 4 forbade the publication or broadcast of anything that was false in any particular or that might bring government officials into ridicule or disrepute. Under this and the internal security decree (Number 2), a number of prominent journalists and editors were arrested. Two who spent nearly a year in prison were adopted as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International. Although journalists continued to test the regime's narrowing limits, the decrees and arrests had a chilling effect on news coverage and editorial commentary and profoundly alienated the intelligentsia.

Decree Number 2, announced in January, 1984, provided for the detention of any citizen deemed a security risk. The implications of this classic authoritarian instrument were not at first fully appreciated, but in the subsequent months the Nigerian Security

²From a peak of \$24 billion in 1980, Nigeria's oil earnings fell to \$18 billion in 1981, \$10 billion in 1983 and \$7 billion in 1985.

³The official value of the naira was about \$1.25 at the end of 1984, and it slipped to \$1.11 at the time of the August, 1985, coup.

⁴See the broadcast statement of the coup by Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro in *West Africa*, September 2, 1985, p. 1828.

Organization (NSO) was given a virtual blank check to arrest and intimidate critics of the regime. Some of Nigeria's most forceful and popular social commentators were imprisoned without trial, appeal or any indication of when they might be released. Others fell silent in a growing climate of fear.

Public disaffection was intensified by the growing economic hardships, which followed from the severe austerity measures imposed by the Buhari government. Although these brought considerable progress toward balancing Nigeria's external payments—an essential condition for coming to grips with an external debt that rose to some \$20 billion in 1984—they came at the price of a deepening economic depression. During 1984, an estimated 50,000 civil servants were retired or dismissed. Tens of thousands of industrial workers lost their jobs as factories remained desperately short of imported raw materials and spare parts. This followed from the decision to devote 44 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings to debt service—at a time when oil earnings (still 95 percent of all export earnings) continued to spiral downward²—leaving barely 3 billion naira for imports in 1985, less than half the 1984 level and less than one-third of peak levels during the oil boom.³

After three years of steep decline in the gross domestic product (GDP), the Nigerian economy seemed hard-pressed to meet even the faint 1 percent growth target in the 1985 budget. Moreover, severe shortages pushed inflation to an annual rate of 40 percent, hitting basic foodstuffs and consumer goods especially hard. Medical services were crippled by severe shortages of drugs and conflict between the government and doctors, who struck for several weeks early in 1985. The plight of the lower and middle classes was further aggravated by regressive new taxes and user fees that made access to schooling and other social services more expensive.

In the context of the deepening economic depression and painful but imperative austerity measures, escalating repression not only engendered profound resentment and bitterness among a people who cherished their personal freedom, it also permitted the regime to govern without any effort to forge a popular consensus or to be accountable for its actions. Perhaps most fatally, the regime's arrogance led it to ignore critical opinion and the imperative for some consensus-building even within its own senior military ranks. After their downfall, Generals Buhari and Idiagbon were pointedly condemned by their successors for their monopolization of power and their paranoiac intolerance of debate and criticism even within the military councils.⁴

THE BABANGIDA REGIME

What was coming to be viewed around the country as an inevitable military coup finally happened on August 27, 1985. The coup was led by Army Chief of

Staff Major General Ibrahim Babangida, a demanding but popular 44-year-old officer who was described as having "the soldier's love of action and the politician's populist instinct."⁵ In a symbolic act reflective of the sharp break he intended to make, Babangida became the first of Nigeria's six military rulers to take the title of President.

From the beginning, Babangida strove to demonstrate a personal commitment to liberal and responsive government. In his maiden address to the nation, he announced the repeal of Decree Number 4 and the immediate release of all journalists in detention.⁶

Other tangible steps toward a more open government quickly followed. The detention centers of the NSO were exposed to public view and a thorough probe and restructuring of that dreaded organization was undertaken. Forceful and opinionated civilians were chosen to head crucial Cabinet ministries, and the ruling military council was reorganized to disperse power and encourage a more consensual style. In an important step toward establishing a more national government, an Igbo, Naval Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, was appointed to the new position of chief of general staff, a less all-encompassing post than Idiagbon's, but still the number two position in government. Babangida further promised to present a program of political transition, beginning with the revitalization of local government.

In perhaps his most extraordinary move, the new military President opened the most sensitive and controversial economic policy question facing his administration—whether to take a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—to vigorous public debate. Negotiations with the IMF for a \$2.5-billion, three-year adjustment loan had been dragging on since well before the December, 1983, coup (with both the Shagari and Buhari governments resisting the stringent conditions), and on assuming office Babangida indicated his intention to complete an IMF agreement.

On strictly economic grounds, the case for the loan seemed urgent and compelling. With foreign debt further swollen to \$22 billion and with oil prices and production still sagging, the country was desperately short of foreign exchange, and its ability to import was drying up. The loan promised to bring not only the \$2.5 billion from the IMF, but perhaps an equivalent amount in loans and credits from other international sources. Moreover, the policy obligations attaching to the loan—involving the orthodox IMF medicine of a steep devaluation of the currency (by

more than half), trade liberalization and substantial cuts in petroleum and other consumer subsidies—enjoyed strong support from economists inside and outside the country.⁷

However, as countless third world leaders have discovered in dealing with the international financial community, economics cannot be divorced from politics. And the politics of the IMF loan—despite Babangida's apparent confidence that he could sell it to the nation—simply would not fly. The debate brought forth a tidal wave of popular, intellectual and interest-group opposition to the loan. Opposition was aroused not simply because of the sharp decline in living standards that would result from the drastic devaluation and the removal of subsidies, and not simply because of the loss of national sovereignty it would imply for a proud nation that had never before had to beg and bend to the IMF. There was also widespread public skepticism that such a large new infusion of cash would be managed any more responsibly than the huge gushes of income from the oil boom. In the face of overwhelming opposition, Babangida was forced to set aside his original plans, and in December his government announced Nigeria's rejection of the IMF loan.

Frustrated but not defeated, this clever and resourceful military politician settled on an ingenious strategy for reconciling political and economic imperatives. While declining to reach a formal agreement with the IMF, he nevertheless proceeded to implement its harsh austerity prescriptions and to reap some of the benefit not only from the consequent painful but necessary adjustments, but also from the increased receptivity of other multilateral and private international lenders. While preserving national pride, he thus inaugurated a historic and radical new phase of economic adjustment.

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

This new phase began in October, 1985, with the declaration of a 15-month economic state of emergency (subsequently extended two more years), and a warning to the country that hard times and sacrifices were ahead. The 1986 budget, announced at the end of 1985, imposed painful austerity measures: sharp cutbacks in petroleum subsidies (leading to a doubling of the pump price for petrol), new taxes on corporate profits, dividends and rents, and a 30 percent general levy on all imports. In addition, the government's wage bill was sharply reduced (including soldiers' pay), which cut federal recurrent expenditures by one-fourth. Most daringly, the new budget promised "a realistic exchange rate policy" that would allow the naira to find its own level.⁸ As a result, the value of the naira, which had stood at \$1.20 early in 1985, continued to float down at an accelerated rate during 1986, from \$1.05 on January 1 to \$0.67 by September.

⁵*Newswatch* (Lagos, Nigeria), September 9, 1985, p. 17.

⁶For the text of this significant national address, see *West Africa*, September 2, 1985, pp. 1791–1793.

⁷Larry Diamond, "High Stakes for Babangida," *Africa Report*, vol. 30, no. 6 (November–December, 1985), p. 56.

⁸For further details on the 1986 budget and its "spirit of emergency," see *West Africa*, January 13, 1986, pp. 52–54.

This did not end the de facto devaluation of the naira. In one of the boldest domestic policy moves by any military government in Nigerian history, the Babangida government opened a "Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market" (SFEM) in September, 1986, throwing the value of the naira, for most transactions, open almost completely to the determination of market forces. The cornerstone of the two-year Structural Adjustment Program launched in July, 1986, the SFEM provides for the weekly auction of foreign exchange in a free market. Although this market is referred to as "second-tier," in fact it encompasses all transactions except government debt service payments and contributions to international institutions. All imports—including those of the government itself—must be paid for with foreign exchange from this market. At the same time, exchange controls and import licensing were lifted, freeing importers to buy as much foreign exchange as they need (depending on its domestic availability). The termination of import licensing was a particularly momentous development (and a key objective for the IMF and internal reformers), because the previous system had been a major source of corruption and inefficiency.

With the opening of the SFEM, the naira quickly fell to the black market rate of between \$.20 and \$.25. Subsequently, the free market rate appreciated slightly, but the official rate has since fallen further to less than \$.40. This deregulation and sharp devaluation of the naira, along with related elements of the Structural Adjustment Program, appear to have had some beneficial effects already. According to President Babangida in his budget message of January 1, 1987, the SFEM has boosted the government's naira revenues, enabling the prompt payment of salaries and other government commitments, while increasing the competitiveness of Nigeria's agricultural exports.

Furthermore, "contrary to many predictions, fears and anxiety, the operation of the SFEM has led neither to capital flight nor frivolous imports." In marked contrast to the days when import licenses were auctioned illicitly, 82 percent of foreign exchange sales have gone to the industrial sector—which remains at less than half of capacity—for desperately needed raw materials and spare parts.⁹ And while consumers have felt the pinch of higher priced imports, the expected inflationary effects of devaluation have been offset to some extent by greater availability, reduced corruption and a switch to locally produced foodstuffs.

The SFEM is only the cutting edge of a broad and immensely ambitious and determined government effort to change the entire incentive structure underpinning Nigeria's economy. A key goal is to break the mentality of spending and importing with reckless abandon

that grew up during the heady days of the oil boom—to foster self-reliance and productivity in "real" sectors of economic activity, other than the effortless fortune that oil provides. Elimination of import and exchange controls removes the huge premiums attached to import-export trade and financial speculation, making productive investment and entrepreneurial activity more attractive. The effective quadrupling of the price of imports fresh off the boat makes indigenous raw materials and intermediate goods more competitive, and may stimulate significant backward linkages in what has been to date a classically dependent industrializing economy.

In addition, the latest budget message takes aim at the careless "throwaway" culture spawned by the oil boom, calling for "a culture of maintenance and repairs" in which emphasis will be placed on maintaining old and existing buildings, plants, vehicles and machinery, rather than constantly building and buying anew.¹⁰ If this initiative is even partially successful, it should significantly reduce the wanton, appalling wastage of resources that has been a trademark of Nigeria since the oil boom.

More broadly, Babangida's Structural Adjustment Program seeks to reduce state intervention in the economy and to unleash the substantial entrepreneurial talent and energy that have heretofore been diverted toward the rapid, huge and low-risk returns associated with trading, speculation and government contracting. Notable among the steps taken have been the abolition of the various commodity marketing boards (which, since colonial days, have tended to retard agricultural productivity by setting low producer prices and appropriating the surplus from farmers), and the announcement of plans to privatize more than 100 public sector enterprises.

These difficult and even courageous measures have begun to make a difference in the Nigerian economy, but unfortunately that difference has been difficult to detect in Nigeria's external accounts because of the collapse of the world oil market. One area where the Buhari regime made progress was in balancing Nigeria's external accounts, transforming a current account deficit in 1984 equal to 6.5 percent of GDP into a surplus of \$500 million in 1985 (about 2 percent of GDP), and increasing external reserves from \$1.1 billion to \$1.6 billion. Accompanying this external improvement was a modest domestic economic growth

(Continued on page 222)

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⁹*Newsweek*, January 12, 1987, pp. 29–30.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

"It is doubtful that any government could have launched economic reform programs like [Ghana's] if there had been democratic rule; previous governments have shied away from devaluations and budget cuts in the face of popular dissent. But the Rawlings regime must permit free debate again and needs to allow wider political participation if it wishes to be regarded as ruling legitimately."

Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism

BY JON KRAUS

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FLIGHT Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings's seizure of power in December, 1981, ended less than three years of civilian rule by President Hilla Limann. During Limann's tenure, the economy deteriorated progressively and state administrative institutions were unable to regulate or implement government policies. The unremitting economic decline had multiple sources: externally, the Ghanaian economy was buffeted by oil price hikes, low terms of trade for Ghana's major commodities during most of 1970-1981, and intermittent world recessions; internally, it suffered from unwise economic policies, mounting distortions in prices (which drastically reduced incentives for production but increased those for smuggling and trading above control prices), and severe drought. Budget deficits grew and increases in the money supply fueled an inflation rate above 50 percent annually between 1976 and 1981. Wage workers and most of the urban population were devastated economically; real incomes dropped by roughly 80 percent during 1970-1982, and per capita gross national product dropped by 30 percent.

Export production declined massively during 1970-1982; cocoa production fell from 413,000 tons in 1970-1971 to 258,000 tons in 1981-1982 (falling to a low of 158,000 tons in 1983-1984); gold production fell by two-thirds, diamonds by 50 percent, and timber production by virtually 90 percent as major mills cranked to a halt for want of capital equipment, spare parts and transport. Decreased export production created import shortages in all spheres of production, distribution, and infrastructure; for example, more than 70 percent of all vehicles were off the road in 1981-1982 because of a shortage of imported spare parts, and factory use averaged less than 25 percent.

Rawlings proclaimed that Ghanaians must carry out a revolution of just rule for the common man and self-reliant development. But Rawlings's populist sentiment and his formation of a civil-military Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) and government elicited less support than did his three months of revolutionary "housecleaning" in mid-1979, when the violence of Rawlings's first coup made com-

plete the disgust of Ghanaians for military rule. However, there was broad popular support for Jerry Rawlings himself, a dynamic, emotional man in his early thirties who was widely regarded as sincere and honest. Rawlings had no intention of creating another military regime; rather, he wanted a revolutionary, antibourgeois, anti-imperialist regime based on the mobilization of ordinary Ghanaians.

Initially Rawlings and the PNDC solicited the support of five groups of the population, including Ghana's few radical activists and intelligentsia, some of whom had been active in the overthrown Limann regime. Rawlings also sought the support of the organized workers and trade unionists, although existing leaders were attacked. Third, the regime looked to secondary school and university students, organizing them through the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS). Rawlings also gained the support of junior officers and other ranks in the military, but not the senior officers, many of whom opposed and were frightened by the coup. Last, he appealed to ordinary Ghanaians, the urban and rural working poor, artisans, fishermen, and the lower ranks of the white collar class, the petty bourgeoisie. Probably several tens of thousands of these were active in People's Defense Councils (PDC's) and Workers Defense Councils (WDC's) in 1982-1983.

That only the military and a small portion of the urban poor continue to support the regime is one measure of the change that has occurred in the regime's initial base of support. The most important early supporters were leftist intellectuals and activists, since they articulated the regime's goals and organized support through the National Defense Committee and the interim Regional Coordinating Committees, which organized local PDC's and WDC's and encouraged their militancy.

NUGS, representing activist university students, at first jubilantly embraced the Rawlings revolution and helped mobilize students. But it withdrew its support within a year, when a newly elected NUGS leadership became highly critical of the PNDC and military violence.

The Trade Union Congress (TUC) and its 17 member unions, with 700,000 members in 1981, were an important base of support; however, they have long tried to maintain their organizational autonomy. While the TUC leaders were receptive to PNDC appeals for change, dissident union leaders organized in the Accra-Tema Association of Local Unions (ALU) demanded a total revamping of the union movement. Though strongly resisted by union leaders, in late April, 1982, ALU leaders and armed PNDC-supported groups took over TUC headquarters. Strong resistance by rank-and-file local leaders prevented ALU domination of interim management committees that were established in each union. There was strong worker resistance to a PNDC-mandated wage freeze, the suspension of collective bargaining rights, and the challenge to the unions' representative workplace role by the assertive but often undemocratically selected WDC's. In elections in 1983, ALU leaders won only some union posts. While union leaders supported the regime's populist measures, all were united on the need to uphold trade union rights.

The military was a key PNDC support base. Rawlings seized power with its assistance. Senior officers were opposed to Rawlings's takeover and widespread mutinies were the result; many senior officers fled. Rawlings encouraged lower rank independence. Other ranks and junior officers became self-appointed enforcers of price controls, not unknown for their violent acts against marketwomen and other civilians.

Thus the military was an unstable base of PNDC support. Its behavior alienated vast numbers of civilians. It was also the major source of threats to the regime. All the major plots and coup attempts, including two invasions of ex-military personnel from neighboring Togo and Ivory Coast, involved the military. The PNDC had no confidence that it could repel attacks or coup efforts. (PNDC security has since been entrusted to the Force Reserve Unit, some 500 men under Major Courage Quashigah.) Since mid-1983, when opposition to military violence reached its highest point, the PNDC has made major efforts to reimpose discipline within the military. It has brought to trial some but not all military personnel accused of violence and killing. Officers are again ascendant and have played an increasingly large role in the government and in state corporations.

The major institutions of radical change were the PDC's and WDC's. Encouraged from above but incapable of being controlled, they came to constitute a dual power structure in the country. However, by 1983-1984 Rawlings's enthusiasm for the defense committees had waned as radicals used them as a power base; their zealotry, unaccountability, occasional corruption and intermittent coercive behavior made them objects of widespread public criticism as well.

In 1983 the PNDC undertook a series of long over-

due economic reforms. These included policies to reduce the huge price distortions, restore exports, reduce inflationary budget deficits, increase prices to cocoa farmers, raise interest rates, and rehabilitate key productive sectors. These measures were necessary to obtain promised large infusions of capital from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Western donors, without which recovery could not occur. The PNDC also announced more popular measures to mobilize the population for self-reliant development, including rent control, price controls for essential commodities, and the development of "people's stores" to ensure the supply of cheap essential goods.

The response to the 1983 reforms was an immediate escalation in the level of opposition from social and political forces already opposed to the PNDC. The Ghana Bar Association had opposed the PNDC's rule from the beginning; it was now joined by the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, church groups, businessmen, students and others. Strikes by lawyers, teachers, workers and students were supported by some ex-party leaders and businessmen. The opposition condemned the PNDC for its incompetence and repression. Attempts to unify the opposition and calls to end the PNDC and install a national representative government mounted. There was also a coup attempt. The PNDC survived this period through the support of some of the more organized PDC's, the unions and the military.

However, Rawlings was very aware of the limits to coercion, the depth of public opposition, and the dubious loyalty and capacities of his radical supporters. Rawlings felt especially pressed to find competent managers and administrators in 1983, because the regime had to cope with the return of more than a million Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria and the drought-induced famine conditions that required the transport and distribution of massive food relief from abroad.

Although Rawlings denounced the "populist nonsense" of constant agitation for improved wages and supplies, he tried to retain the regime's populist support. The PNDC directed imported essential commodities and local foods to workers and other groups, including people's stores, persisted in the policy of no retrenchments in public and private enterprises, kept a lid on bus fares and rents (where per room costs per month were less than several loaves of bread), and promised to introduce a wealth tax. Politically, the PNDC used citizen vetting committees to audit the expenditure patterns of prominent citizens to compel them to pay their income taxes; promised district and local council elections; formed a broad political front of popular and patriotic elements to increase participation in decision making; and established public tribunals at the national and regional levels.

The public tribunals were a response to deeply felt public sentiment that corrupt managers, capitalists, smugglers and bureaucrats never suffered for their "nation-wrecking" crimes. They were to be bound not by formal legal procedures but by natural justice. While the tribunals have been criticized on various grounds, they are headed by lawyers and deliver somewhat more prompt retribution for the vast degree of public corruption, theft, fraud and embezzlement that afflicts public life in Ghana. Although the bar has boycotted the tribunals, their proceedings continue to provide Ghanaians with some sense that the regime will not tolerate the theft of public resources and coercive abuses of citizens. Unfortunately, both abuses remain.

In contrast to these pro-populist measures, Rawlings has tried to reduce the power of the defense committees and several radical movements, and has repeatedly criticized the trade unions. In early 1984, the PDC's were opened to "all patriotic Ghanaians," whereas earlier they had excluded members of the merchant-professional-managerial bourgeoisie. Regular criticisms of the PDC's by regime spokesmen were published. The Tema PDC coordinating committee, which represented the most militant sector of the defense committees, was dissolved in 1984. On December 1, 1984, the regime announced that the National Defense Committee, which coordinated the defense committees, had been abolished; PDC's and WDC's were henceforth to be called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's), their leaders directly responsible to the government's district and regional secretaries. The change was an attempt to eliminate the political role and confine the CDR's to economic support and mobilization functions. On December 3, the interim management committees in all state corporations and statutory boards were eliminated, and joint consultative committees were established that were only advisory.

Simultaneously, the cedi was devalued and price controls were lifted on all but 17 manufactured and imported commodities. The left publicly denounced both these moves. Still, in 1985 police raided regional CDR centers in the Eastern and Volta regions and in Tema, arresting CDR leaders for security reasons. In 1986, CDR and union leaders were arrested at a factory when they protested unsafe working conditions; in April, the government arrested several CDR and leftist political organization leaders for encouraging massive worker protests and threatening to strike to protest the government's decision to end all leave allowances—a measure that the PNDC had to cancel. However, the CDR's no longer play an important, independent role in Rawlings's government. Rawlings has clearly concluded that the defense committees were unpopular with Ghanaians and were more destructive than constructive.

In late 1983, Rawlings extended his policy of "rec-

onciliation" among Ghanaians by making peace with major established groups and bringing moderates into the government and the PNDC. High Court Judge D.F. Annan accepted PNDC membership in the hope that it would become more "balanced," but moderates have been hard to recruit. A women's representative and an educated northern chief have been added, but the PNDC itself has not become a key institution. Rawlings has recruited professionals and technocrats for the Cabinet, many of high quality, but turnover in Cabinet positions has been frequent and mostly unexplained; since 1982 there have been six Greater Accra, five agricultural, and six trade ministers, but only one in finance and economic planning.

Rawlings and Annan sought to make peace with the tribal chiefs, whom they saw as instruments of stability and linkage with the rural grass roots. Rawlings reduced the strong anti-PDC and -PNDC sentiment in Ashanti and among the chiefs by traveling there to meet with the Ashanti paramount, the Asantehene; he appointed a new regional secretary, F.A. Jantuah, a lawyer and ex-Nkrumah period leader, with the Asantehene's agreement, to deal toughly with the PDC's and radicals who were accused of molestation and disruptive activities. The Asantehene and other prominent chiefs (including several senior ex-military officers) publicly pledged cooperation with the government in 1984–1985. Catholic and Protestant church leaders, who had been prominent critics of military violence and harassment, were mollified by the strong measures to restore discipline in the military. Regional consultative committees of professionals, chiefs, and businessmen were established in 1984 to advise the regime.

Rawlings also tried to place the state corporations in the hands of professional managers and technocrats who would restore their effectiveness and profitability, giving them wide latitude to do so. Professionals and technocrats running ministries were protected from outside political intervention in implementing policies. Businessmen and their organizations were strongly encouraged by the effective elimination of most price controls by 1984–1985 to reinvest and by the easing of regulations on layoffs. However, most lawyers and the Ghana Bar Association have resisted the "reconciliatory" gestures, and remain opposed to the PNDC's authoritarian rule, detentions and the public tribunals.

The PNDC's changes have not prevented exiled opposition groups from pursuing efforts to oppose and overthrow the PNDC. The most important opposition groups are the Ghana Democratic Movement, headed by J.H. Mensah, and the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana, headed by ex-Major Boakye-Djan, a leader in Rawlings's 1979 military government. These groups have organized financial support and arms purchases for groups of former soldiers based in Togo or the Ivory Coast (on either side of Ghana);

these insurgents have periodically infiltrated into Ghana to spark an uprising within the military. Plots or invasions have occurred every year since 1983, as have coup trials and executions. Security threats preoccupy Rawlings and his intelligence chief, Kojo Tsikata.

On various occasions, the PNDC government has accused the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of involvement in these plots. This possibility is in apparent conflict with strong American aid for the economic recovery program but highly congruent with United States paranoia regarding Libya* and President Ronald Reagan's antagonism toward "radical" regimes. Ghana uncovered a United States intelligence-gathering operation in Ghana in 1985, which led to the arrest and conviction of a Ghanaian, Michael Soussoudis, in the United States for spying on the United States. Soussoudis was exchanged for eight Ghanaians who had been tried in Ghana for providing the CIA with information; this was followed by a round of diplomatic expulsions, renewed antagonism, and a reduction in United States aid. In 1986, a ship loaded with arms and eight American mercenaries left Argentina and was stopped in Brazil. The mercenaries were arrested and testified that they planned to overthrow the PNDC government. They were to pick up several hundred Ghanaians in the Ivory Coast, and then proceed to a landing in Ghana. In fact, an American with known CIA-Israeli intelligence connections in New York¹ was involved in the expedition's organization.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

Ghana's economy has made considerable gains since 1982 and 1983, when gross domestic product (GDP) grew 6.4 percent and 0.7 percent. Data do not indicate the strides made, the pain involved, and the long distance to go. GDP growth in real terms was 7.5 percent in 1984, about 6 percent in 1985, and perhaps in the 4 to 5 percent range in 1986. There were large infusions of short-term capital from the IMF (\$600 million in 1983-1985), much of it expended on emergency spare parts, imports and rehabilitation programs; longer term and mostly soft-term loans came from the World Bank's International Development Association (some \$550 million through 1986). A great deal of this aid was disbursed slowly and was aimed at particular projects; additional small amounts of aid flowed from Western countries, including the United States, which simultaneously lauded Ghana's politically courageous economic restructuring and were stingy with their aid. The key to restoring self-sustaining growth was a renewal of the export sector, whose earnings finance

imports critical for capital investments and spare parts. Export earnings rose from \$439 million in 1983 to an estimated \$700 million in 1986; imports were somewhat larger. Cocoa production recovered from its 1983-1984 low of 158,000 tons to 210,000 in 1985-1986 and possibly to more than 225,000 tons in 1986-1987.

The producer price to cocoa farmers has been raised by the PNDC from 12,000 cedi per ton in 1982 to 85,000 cedi per ton in 1986, a sevenfold increase. Similar price increases have been made for other export crops. Gold exports also rose sharply, while timber exports quadrupled from their 1983 low to \$60 million in 1986. More important, with aid and private capital, investments have been made in the rehabilitation of these sectors. Ashanti Goldfields has started a six-year, \$160-million expansion and modernization project that will greatly increase output; the State Gold Mine Corporation is engaged in a \$67-million expansion project. New firms are also making investments in gold mining for the first time in 40 years. World Bank loans have improved rail links, which allowed the Ghana National Manganese Corporation to more than double its production between 1982 and 1986, though it is still 30 percent below 1970 levels. Diamond production also almost doubled between 1984 and 1985 but is still only 25 percent of its 1975 level. Road repairs and major inflows of spare parts have put legions of trucks back on the roads and have greatly facilitated food flows to the towns.

The export expansion has been due largely to new price incentives for exports, which were made possible by sharp, repeated devaluations. The value of the cedi fell from a nominal ₵2.75 = \$1 in early 1983 to ₵30 = \$1 in late 1983 to ₵90 = \$1 in early 1986, or 3.1 percent of its nominal 1983 value (nominal since consumers paid black market prices for many goods). The devaluation has had two major impacts. First, exporters were paid far more cedis for their exports, making it possible to increase the prices to cocoa farmers and other producers. Second, imported goods became more expensive. The inflation rate of 123 percent in 1983 was largely due to the 145 percent increase in local food costs caused by the drought. Inflation was 40 percent in 1984, 12 percent in 1985, and 11 percent in the first six months of 1986 (estimates

(Continued on page 227)

Jon Kraus undertook research in Ghana during 1985. His most recent publications are "The Political Economy of Agricultural Regression in Ghana," in Stephen Commins, Michael Lofchie and R. Payne, eds., *Africa's Agrarian Crisis* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), and "The Political Economy of Trade Union-State Relations in Radical and Populist Regimes in Africa," in Roger Southall, ed., *Labour and Unions in Asia and Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1987).

*Libya and Ghana had close relations in 1982-1983.

¹See *West Africa*, December 2, 1985, pp. 2517-2518, and reports by the columnist Jack Anderson, November 18 through 20, 1986; Anderson's reports have since been confirmed by two of the mercenaries who escaped.

"The measures [Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi] has taken to entrench his rule have only weakened it. And the greed that has led him to dominate the country's economy has jeopardized Kenya's economic progress."

Kenya: The Dissolution of Democracy

BY MICHAEL PAUL MAREN

Contributing Editor, Africa Report

PRESIDENT Daniel arap Moi's nine-year tenure as President of Kenya has been characterized by a steady consolidation of political and economic power in the hands of a new elite. In this regard, 1986 was a crucial year. Moi has switched from efforts to control opposition within the party and government institutions to efforts that were designed to alter institutions and to restrict avenues for legal opposition permanently. This has forced opposition elements in Kenya to seek other channels for protest.

In 1980, it appeared that Kenya was becoming one of Africa's most vibrant democracies. The suspicion and intrigue that had followed President Daniel arap Moi's peaceful (but very nearly disastrous) accession to the presidency following the death of Jomo Kenyatta had all but faded. The publication that year of an exposé of the attempt by the Kikuyu power elite to dispose of Moi signaled Kenyans that political maneuvering was out in the open and that subjects once regarded as taboo could be discussed.¹

Moi had released virtually all the country's political prisoners. Newspapers, at first cautious, had edged into the political fray and had begun to publish lively debate on the political issues of the day.² A parliamentary election in 1979 had unseated unpopular politicians who had nonetheless somehow been perennial

winners under Kenyatta. The election was the most hotly contested in Kenya's history, with multiple candidates (several districts had as many as 12) courting the electorate with diverse views.

Moi declared war on corruption and quietly dismissed and sought reimbursement from some of Kenyatta's old and possibly corrupt cronies. University of Nairobi students staged a pro-Moi rally in the streets of Nairobi. They carried banners advocating that Moi take a more nonaligned position in foreign affairs, abandoning the pro-Western policies that Kenya had followed under Kenyatta. The students were also pressing for a reduction in the number of expatriate workers in Kenya in order to open positions for university graduates. Moi responded favorably to the students' requests, although he did little about them.

To the disappointment of the Kenyatta contingent who remained in his Cabinet, the new President behaved like a grass-roots populist. In one of his first national speeches he called for a program to provide schoolchildren with free milk³ and advocated a national program of land reform, an issue that had been on the leftist agenda since independence. And he suspended the allocation of government-owned plots of land that were going to the wealthy instead of the poor.

But most significantly, there was increasing popular enthusiasm about the creation of a second political party to challenge the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). KANU had been the sole political party in Kenya since 1969, when the socialist-leaning Kenya People's Union led by former Vice President Oginga Odinga had been banned. Though Kenya had been a de facto one-party state, the Kenyatta government's sensitivity to the requirements of its democratic facade had precluded the imposition of a de jure one-party state. Kenyatta and his attorney general, Charles Njonjo, always insisted that another party would be tolerated as long as the party was in keeping with the spirit of national development in Kenya. In practice, however, any criticism of KANU was viewed as treason, and all attempts to form a second party were quickly nipped in the bud.

Even during the heavy-handed rule of the Kenyatta era, Kenya had developed strong national institu-

¹Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng's *The Kenyatta Succession* (Nairobi: Transafrica Press, 1980) exposed some of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering by Kenyatta's inner circle—referred to as "the Family"—to prevent Moi from becoming President. It also raised formerly taboo subjects like the Kenyatta government's murder of MP J.M. Kariuki in March, 1975.

²The main papers are the English-language dailies, *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*. In 1983, KANU introduced a third daily, *The Kenya Times*, and switched the bulk of government advertising to it. *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard* have the largest circulations.

³The school milk program turned out to be a disaster. There simply wasn't enough commercially available milk in the country for all the students. The increased demand drove up prices and diverted milk from the Kenya Cooperative Creameries and onto the black market. For months there was no milk commercially available in Kenya. Because of transport problems, much of the milk arrived spoiled at the primary schools. The papers ran photographs of large amounts of milk being dumped on the ground; meanwhile Kenyans grumbled over black tea at their favorite chai houses.

tions. A strong judiciary would on occasion declare a parliamentary ruling unconstitutional. A tenured attorney general, free from political pressures, could investigate and prosecute cases of gross corruption.⁴ An active and informed electorate participated enthusiastically in parliamentary elections, making the best of candidates from one party and regularly unseating half the incumbent candidates. Parliamentary debates were lively, although they usually avoided issues that came in direct conflict with presidential priorities.

In the years that followed, Moi's popular promise to battle corruption stopped well short of any meaningful reform and, in the end, most of the moves he made against corruption must be regarded as a vendetta against the former Kikuyu elite. His promise to take land allocation out of the hands of the "big men" served only to delay allocation until a second generation of big men arose.

In 1980, Moi was apparently trying to build strong popular support rather than a corrupt elite. But he quickly changed course, and by the middle of 1981 popular dissent was on the rise. The university was closed because of student protests. Food shortages began to alienate the urban middle class. And Moi began clamping down.

As Vice President, Moi had been widely regarded as a compromise. He comes from the small Kalenjin ethnic group—a non-Luo and a non-Kikuyu in a political arena that had been dominated by those two ethnic groups. It was widely assumed that the Kikuyu would never stand for a Luo President and the Luo would never stand for a second consecutive Kikuyu President. Attacks against Moi began even before Kenyatta's death in the form of a movement to change the constitution dominated by Kikuyu from Kenyatta's own clan who wanted to assure that one of their own would succeed the ailing Kenyatta. Kenyatta's circle feared that their economic dominance would suffer unless a Kikuyu—and one from Kenyatta's district, Kiambu—achieved the presidency. (As it turns out, they were right.)

But it was the attorney general, Charles Njonjo, who assured Moi's ascendancy, cutting off all debate by proclaiming it illegal to anticipate the President's death. And when Kenyatta finally died in August, 1978, Njonjo was the first at Moi's side proclaiming loyalty, followed quickly by Minister of Finance Mwai Kibaki. Both Njonjo and Kibaki were Kikuyu from other clans, and both had their reasons for fearing Kenyatta's "family."

Njonjo clearly had ambitions beyond the attorney general's office. In 1980, he resigned his tenured post to run for Parliament and took the newly created portfolio of minister of home and constitutional affairs.

This allowed him to serve more or less the same function as the attorney general while adding to his portfolio the control of the security police. And as a member of Parliament he was in a position to become President.

But Moi was not prepared to be an interim President. He began to act decisively and independently, reshuffling the old Cabinet and moving his own men into positions of prominence.

In 1981, there was talk of underground plots, and a cousin of Njonjo's was found smuggling weapons for a coup attempt. In court he blamed Njonjo for the plot, but the charges were publicly declared ridiculous. Apparently Moi, however, did not agree, and in 1983 he disposed of Njonjo by dropping hints that his old ally was a traitor in the service of foreigners. The courts did the rest, exposing to the public what they had already suspected about Njonjo—his connections to Israel and South Africa and his misuse of authority.

Moi's adept political maneuvering since 1981 has surprised supporters and foes alike. He has been able to use people for his own ends and then quickly dispose of them, placing in office only people who are loyal to him. In 1982, Moi rushed legislation through Parliament making Kenya a *de jure* one-party state, and KANU began to supersede Parliament as the main decision-making body in the country. The failed coup attempt in that year only temporarily slowed the accumulation of political and economic power that Moi had begun.

In 1983, a year earlier than constitutionally mandated, Moi called for a surprise general election to purge the Parliament of disloyal elements. Although several of Moi's opponents were returned to office, a Cabinet reshuffle drew the inner circle of power closer to Moi. Significantly, the turnout in that election was less than 48 percent, the lowest in Kenya's history.

This trend continued in 1986, but the pace was quickened and the stakes were raised. Moi began the year by attempting to force out Vice President Mwai Kibaki—one of the last holdouts in his Cabinet from the Kenyatta days. Kibaki had been one of the first major Kikuyu politicians to support Moi and was largely responsible for aligning the Kikuyu from his Nyeri district behind the new government. Aside from his official duties, Kibaki is considered to be Moi's envoy to the Kikuyu and the insurance against a possible Kikuyu insurrection.

But, as he did in the case of Charles Njonjo, Moi turned the dogs loose on Kibaki and stepped back as if the Vice President's political problems were the consequences of democracy in action.

The attacks on Kibaki began in March over the most trivial of points. Speaking at a fund-raising meeting, Moi called for an end to "squabbling" among politicians from Nyeri, Kibaki's home district. Several days later, Kibaki commented that there had been no

⁴This was often used as a political weapon against Kenyatta's enemies. Nonetheless, the institution functioned.

squabbling in the district. Kibaki was then attacked in Parliament for contradicting the President. The assault was led by Elijah Mwangale, the minister of foreign affairs and Moi's preferred candidate for the post of Vice President.

Though the Kenyan press addressed the issue by feigning confusion, it was clear to everyone else that nobody would dare attack the Vice President without the approval and instigation of a higher authority. Kibaki was nonetheless able to hang on, and by the end of the year he and Moi were behaving as if nothing had happened between them.

Beginning in March, 1986, opposition to the government began gaining strength at an accelerated pace, and government and antigovernment forces met each other's challenges with bolder and bolder moves.

But by far the most noted opposition to the government came from an underground movement that called itself Mwakenya. Mwakenya, a Swahili acronym for the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Kenya, first came to the public's attention in March, 1986, when the government announced the arrests of several lecturers and dissidents. Before that time few people had ever heard of the movement or its allegedly seditious publication called *Mpatanishi* (Swahili for "The Arbiter"). Ironically, the government gave the dissidents their biggest boost by publicizing the movement.

When Mwakenya first appeared, the government took a gamble by allowing press coverage of arrests and trials. The government may have thought that publicity would rally public support against the dissidents and discourage further activity. But as time went on and layer after layer of the Mwakenya was peeled away, it became evident that the organization represented a widespread cross section of Kenyan society.

Political dissent in Kenya had traditionally been the province of self-labeled intellectuals, university students and, to a lesser extent, the urban landless. Earlier dissident groups formed along the same lines as Mwakenya had failed miserably at gathering any public support. (Several years earlier a similar group called the December 12th movement, after the date of Kenya's independence, attempted a similar campaign. But it never gained popular backing and the government was able to close it down.) The Mwakenya investigation revealed that this group had a significant base among farmers and the country's influential middle class—clerks, bankers and the like. These were the people that Moi had always counted on for support.

Most significant, Mwakenya was not based on a single ethnic group. "This is the first truly national resistance movement I've seen in Kenya," a Western diplomat told this writer in Nairobi. He guessed that

there were perhaps a thousand hard-core members of the organization, but hundreds of thousands of sympathizers.

A railway clerk was charged with plotting to sabotage a train and, in another case, a government agriculture officer was jailed with two university graduates for an attempt to derail a freight train. In court, the three defied government attempts to get them to express public remorse for their "crimes": "We did not commit any criminal offenses. Those targets were selected by our guerrilla commanders in our declared warfare,"⁵ they announced. The comments were printed in the newspapers, and support for the group grew.

In February, 1987, it was revealed that several leading politicians were also involved in Mwakenya, including one of Moi's most trusted lieutenants, Kariuki Chotara. Chotara had been a leader of the anti-colonial Mau Mau movement (one of the few ever to hold public office in the government of independent Kenya) and had risen to become KANU district chairman in Nakuru. Chotara was also tied to Koigi Wamwere, a dissident parliamentarian who fled Kenya in September, 1986, fearing for his life. Allegedly the two MP's had participated in a mass Mwakenya oath-taking ceremony in July, 1986.

The scope of the movement caused the government to place large amounts of discretionary power in the hands of the secret police, known as the Special Branch, which served only to alienate Kenyans and rally support for the dissidents. The Special Branch began a nationwide crackdown, arresting anyone who might be an instigator or who had been found in possession of *Mpatanishi*.

Over 500 people have been detained for various periods of time and around 100 people are in detention at this writing. Recent letters smuggled from Kenya's prisons have detailed torture. These allegations have been denied by the Kenyan government, which insists on its respect for human rights—but the overwhelming evidence supports the claims of the detainees. The special police have clearly been granted extraordinary powers and autonomy.

When it became apparent that the government's attempt to use publicity against Mwakenya had failed, Moi attempted to put an end to the debate. In June, Moi canceled all public meetings scheduled for a national holiday on the pretext that late rains required farmers to tend their crops rather than attend the celebrations. At the same time, he warned foreign journalists against spreading rumors, and hinted that Mwakenya was under foreign control—a standard tactic when the government finds itself under siege from domestic forces.

A MYSTERIOUS ORGANIZATION

Despite the brouhaha, little is really known about Mwakenya. The organization is organized in cells like

⁵The Daily Nation, July 5, 1986.

the anticolonial Mau Mau. And, in the style of the Mau Mau, members take blood oaths that they are willing to die for the movement.

Oath-taking is regarded very seriously in Kenya by both the government and those taking oaths. Rooted deeply in Kenyan mythology, an oath is the strongest commitment that a Kenyan can make. The Kenyan government is so afraid of oath-taking that oath-taking of any kind is banned in the country.

Opposition has found other voices in Kenya. The National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK) and the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) both figured prominently in opposition to Moi's attempts to alter the country's democratic institutions. The stands taken by these institutions were unprecedented and resilient. Their protests brought official scorn on both organizations and, as usual, the government leveled allegations that they were in the service of foreign powers. But these were not individuals following their personal interests. They were respected organizations and their voices were too loud to ignore. Both groups held firm, and Kenyans began to regard them as an opposition party of sorts.

Their protests were first raised in August, when KANU announced that henceforth people would vote for candidates in primary elections by lining up behind the candidate of their choice. Should any candidate receive 70 percent of the vote in the primary, according to the new rules, the candidate would then stand unopposed in the general election.

The move guaranteed complete top-down control over elections, since no Kenyan would dare contravene the stated will of the party. The official party line was that elections were being "opened" to counteract vote fraud and shady dealings. One member of Parliament attacked the church's opposition to the move by wondering how the church, "which considered itself the light of the world, could support doing something in secret."⁶

In November, Moi advanced his dominance over the government. For the first time, he officially declared that the party, well under his control, superseded the authority of the Parliament. The Parliament, always limited in its power, was reduced to an advisory role.

Moi also suspended the tenure of the attorney general and of the controller general, making the posts political appointments under his personal control. The controller general had originally been independent to give the officeholder latitude in investigating cases of financial misconduct, and the attorney general's independence was to ensure objectivity in the enforcement of law. Moi's amendments to the constitution would normally have been challenged by the attorney general, but Matthew Muli, who held the post, went along enthusiastically and the Parliament passed the measure

⁶*Weekly Review* (Kenya), December 19, 1986.

⁷*Weekly Review*, December 5, 1986.

with unanimous assent. Only one MP, Charles Rubia, protested, and he was tossed out of the chamber before the final vote and was later jailed for five days. (Rubia had earlier spoken publicly in support of the NCCCK.) The laws that had been dispensed with were called "foreign and obsolete" by one member of Parliament.⁷ It was clear that few politicians were willing to oppose Moi's will.

In February, 1987, a redistricting plan was announced that would add 30 new seats to the Parliament, bringing the number of elected MP's to 188. The larger body would serve to dilute the influence of any single member. The realignment of district boundaries was also a blatant example of gerrymandering, alienating several key opposition members of Parliament from their traditional constituencies and reinforcing the strength of Moi's closest associates.

The NCCCK and LSK stood firm, lodging protests and, in effect, challenging the government. Though the government has taken some action, like encouraging member churches to leave the NCCCK, there has been no strong move against the organization itself. The NCCCK's stance against the government has been too popular.

It is particularly significant that popular opposition to the government grew so dramatically in 1986, a year of strong economic growth due to high coffee and tea prices, low oil import bills and a large increase in tourism revenues. For the first time in nearly a decade, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rose above population growth rates. These factors usually temper opposition.

But despite the high coffee prices, small farmers did not receive much more for their harvest than they had the previous year. The government tried to explain that falling coffee prices during the last two months of the year had overturned the high expectations that had been raised earlier in the year. The farmers did not believe it.

The public seems to believe that many economic problems are rooted in government corruption. Kenyans are aware that it has been an economic boom year, and many think that the revenues are lining the pockets of Moi and his friends. In the past year, Moi and his business associates have bought vast holdings of real estate in Nairobi. "Kenyans no longer try to figure out which buildings Moi owns; they try to figure out which buildings he doesn't own," a friend in Nairobi told this writer. Reliable sources have also confirmed that Moi has bought, through a Delaware-based holding company, the Kenya Oil Company and Mobil Oil, Kenya. The new company is

(Continued on page 228)

Michael Paul Maren was an assistant editor of *Africa Report* during 1983-1984. From 1977 to 1982 he lived in Kenya, and he returned twice during 1986.

The death of Mozambican President Machel stunned Mozambique. His successor, Joaquim Chissano, has made it clear that he will "continue his predecessor's domestic and foreign policies and broad socialist agenda. [But] given the deteriorating situation and his limited options, the new leader has little space in which to maneuver."

Mozambique and the Regional Conflict in Southern Africa

BY ALLEN ISAACMAN

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ON October 19, 1986, Mozambique's charismatic President Samora Machel died in a plane crash.¹ Two weeks later, the Central Committee of the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) elected Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano as his successor. His selection comes at a critical juncture in the history of Mozambique. At the time of Machel's death, Mozambique faced mounting crises. The economy was in disarray, parts of the country were again facing famine, many rural health and educational programs had come to a standstill, and the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), known alternatively as RENAMO, had launched a major offensive in the strategic central provinces. To make matters worse, these attacks had paralyzed the transportation network critical not only for the survival of Mozambique but for Zimbabwe as well.

The death of Machel, however devastating, merely compounded an increasingly difficult situation. Both the crises that the young nation has experienced and the present choices and constraints that the new government faces are rooted in deeper structural relationships: a distorted colonial economy excessively dependent on South Africa; a set of misguided or poorly implemented state and party policies; and, above all else, Pretoria's destabilization campaign.

Reports of a succession crisis involving as many as five senior Mozambican officials proved unfounded. In hindsight, President Chissano's selection was relatively smooth. His highly visible role in the independence struggle, his ability to pull the party together through a series of factional crises in the late 1960's and unite it behind Machel after the assassination of party founder Eduardo Mondlane, and his position as Prime Minister during the 1974–1975 transitional

government gave him a clear edge over any potential rivals. So, too, did the fact that he was regarded as the most popular public official after Machel, according to Western diplomats. This relatively smooth succession seems to have provided Chissano with much needed time and space to try to reverse the deteriorating situation—in part a legacy of Portuguese colonialism.

Lisbon has maintained a nominal presence in Mozambique since the sixteenth century and imposed political domination shortly after the turn of the century; but South Africa quickly came to dominate Mozambique's economy. From the outset, the most salient feature of Portuguese colonialism was the absence of development capital. This lack of capital provided South African and British investors with a strategic entry point from which to dominate the Mozambican economy. Without substantial investments, Portuguese interests, both in the metropole and in Mozambique, could hope to extract only a portion of the colony's resources by transforming the rural area into a labor reserve. This transformation would, through state intervention, generate a large, bound and ultra-cheap labor force. An 1899 government commission, whose task it was to analyze the prospects for development in Mozambique, concluded:

We need native labor, we need it in order to better the conditions of these laborers, we need it for the economy of Europe, and for the progress of Africa. Our tropical Africa will not grow without the Africans. The capital needed to exploit it, and it so needs to be exploited, lies in the procurement of labor for exploitation. Abundant, cheap, solid labor . . . and this labor, given the circumstances, will never be supplied by European immigrants.²

Colonial officials anticipated that by forcing male members of the rural population to pay a tax in European currency and by imposing artificially low prices that strangled peasant initiative, rural males would be compelled to seek employment on Portuguese and foreign-controlled plantations, in the embryonic light industrial sector, and in the port towns of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and Beira. The tax laws did

¹For discussion of the causes of the crash, see *Business Day*, October 21, 1986; *The New York Times*, January 27, 1987; *South*, December, 1986.

²Quoted in J. M. da Silva Cunha, *O Trabalho Indígena: Estudo do Direito Colonial* (Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colónias, 1949), p. 144.

provide the state with a new source of revenue, but initially they failed to generate a cheap labor force on a sufficient scale and required the colonial state to resort to undisguised coercion known as *chibalo*. However, just as the lack of Portuguese capital provided an opening for South African investors, so the forced labor policy designed to remedy this situation drove thousands of Mozambican migrant laborers to the relatively better paying South African gold mines. The result was to reinforce Mozambique's dependence on its southern neighbor.

Anxious to secure "rent" for the loss of its "natives," Portugal signed a formal agreement in 1901 with the Witwatersrand Labor Association (WNLA), the official representative of the South African mining industry. Under this accord, the colonial state received 13 shillings per mineworker plus 6 pence more for each month's service beyond the initial one-year contract period. As a result of subsequent agreements in which a portion of the workers' salaries was paid directly to the state in gold at a fixed rate of exchange, which was well below the market rate, labor "rent" for between 80,000 and 100,000 miners became the colony's major source of income. Thus the colony became inextricably linked to South Africa.³

The 1901 labor treaty also laid the foundation for another form of dependence on South Africa. In return for cheap labor, South Africa agreed to divert from Capetown to the port of Lourenço Marques a specified percentage of imports to and exports from the Transvaal. Lisbon's capitulation in 1928 to South African demands that the congested port of Lourenço Marques be managed more efficiently and that Mozambique continue to export a prescribed number of mineworkers suggests the extent to which it had already become an economic satellite of its southern neighbor.

At the same time that this agreement was signed, an obscure professor of economics, Antonio Salazar, became Portugal's finance minister and, shortly thereafter, Prime Minister, heralding 40 years of fascism. Salazar's colonial policy rested on two interdependent propositions that theoretically placed him in

direct opposition to South Africa. Fiercely nationalist, he insisted that the colonies had to remain under the firm grip of Lisbon. Second, the human and natural resources of Mozambique had to be more effectively and directly exploited for the benefit of Portugal and the nascent Portuguese capitalist class rather than for the benefit of foreign investors, including the South Africans. To achieve these goals, he promoted a neomercantilist policy in which state intervention figured prominently at all levels of the economy. At the same time, he continued the prior practice of denying any educational or economic opportunities to Mozambicans.⁴

Yet for all Salazar's rhetoric of economic nationalism and his neomercantile policies, his regime failed to extricate Mozambique from South Africa's economic hegemony. To the contrary, as the colony's balance of payment problems expanded, Mozambique's dependency on South African "invisible income"—generated by wage remittances from the miners and port and transit fees—became increasingly significant. And despite continued complaints from representatives of settler agriculture about the lack of cheap African labor, Salazar permitted an increasing number of Mozambicans to work in the mines.

Expanding economic ties and a shared racist ideology motivated Pretoria to provide military assistance to Mozambique in the face of the growing threat from FRELIMO, which initiated an armed struggle in 1964.⁵ A decade later, in April, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement launched its successful coup in Portugal, ending 40 years of fascism and raising the possibility of Mozambican independence. In the aftermath of the coup, policymakers in Pretoria, who had been forewarned by their own intelligence services of the deteriorating war situation in Mozambique and the growing antiwar sentiment in Portugal, were faced with the difficult decision of whether or not to intervene militarily. The Lusaka Agreement in September, 1974, in which the new Portuguese government reluctantly acceded to FRELIMO's demand for independence after a nine-month transitional phase, precluded a neocolonial solution that would have allowed Pretoria to exercise maximum leverage without intervening.

With this option denied to it, Pretoria had to make a difficult decision. Powerful forces in the military and in the right wing of the Nationalist party called for intervention. The South African government of Prime Minister John Vorster resisted the immediate temptation of direct intervention when it became clear that there was no real "moderate alternative" who could guarantee political stability on its northern border. But short of direct intervention, Pretoria could still exercise enormous economic and military leverage in order to narrow FRELIMO's options and to perpetuate its own regional domination. Vorster warned

³For a discussion of Mozambican labor migration to South Africa, see Ruth First, *Black Gold* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983); William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

⁴For the broad outlines of Salazar's policy see Alan Smith, "Antonio Salazar and the Reversal of Portuguese Colonial Policy," *Journal of African History*, vol. 15 (1974), pp. 653–668; Allen and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); Barry Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and Its Origins* (London: Longmans, 1983).

⁵United Nations, General Assembly, report no. A/AC.109/L.919 (February 8, 1974); David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 179.

FRELIMO leaders that despite Mozambique's economic potential, "it cannot stand on its own legs without the cooperation of South Africa."⁶ And he was right. Between 1970 and 1974, Mozambique's gross national product (GNP) declined by 17 percent, and by 1974 Mozambique derived half of all its hard currency from economic relations with South Africa. Moreover, Vorster did not preclude future military intervention.⁷

INDEPENDENT MOZAMBIQUE

With independence and state power, FRELIMO was theoretically positioned to set in motion policies that, over time, might transform Mozambique's distorted economy and reshape its relations with South Africa. But even before such policies could be considered, forces beyond the government's control foreclosed such an option. A combination of natural calamities that destroyed much of the nation's agricultural output, the extensive sabotage of factories, trucks and farm equipment by Portuguese settlers, and the massive exodus of technicians and professionals left Mozambique's fragile economy in disarray. With more than 90 percent of the country illiterate, the new government lacked the expertise to manage the economy. There were, for example, only a handful of economists and not a single agronomist in the entire country.

Even with the most prudent policies, the problems facing the new government were overwhelming. In the years immediately after independence, recurring military attacks by the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia and its MNR surrogates further exacerbated these difficulties. To make matters worse, inexperience, revolutionary zeal and the need to take immediate action to reverse the spiral of impoverishment and instability prompted a number of poorly conceived or improperly implemented policies. Nevertheless, substantial gains were made in health, housing and education.⁸

FRELIMO had inherited a distorted, dependent and deteriorating economy. It had to keep the existing structures functioning to sustain a viable level of life, while simultaneously restructuring critical sectors to achieve its socialist agenda.

Because 90 percent of the Mozambicans were peas-

ants who, with rudimentary tools, cultivated less than five acres per family, agricultural transformation rather than industry was at the core of FRELIMO's long-range economic program. "The socialization of the countryside," to use FRELIMO's lexicon, rested on the creation of a network of productive state farms and the organization of communal villages, with agricultural cooperatives serving as their economic base.

Although there was heated debate (which carried important ideological and developmental implications) about which of the two should receive higher priority, proponents of state farms prevailed. At the third party congress in 1977, they argued that grouping together the most accessible of the abandoned settler farms and modernizing production under the direction of the state offered the quickest way to resolve the country's traditional food shortages and to ensure that between 150,000 and 200,000 rural workers who had been left idle when the settlers fled would again be employed in productive labor. By 1982, the state had invested more than 50 million pounds sterling in agricultural machinery, including 3,000 tractors and 300 combine harvesters, and had incorporated 35,000 acres of choice land into the system.⁹

For all the fanfare and elaborate projections, the experiment was a dismal failure. Although receiving the lion's share of the agricultural budget, by 1982 state farms accounted for only 20 percent of the total output. Poor planning, lack of management skills, a dearth of technical experts to organize production on these large complexes, inappropriate and expensive foreign equipment and an unwillingness or inability to mobilize rural workers all contributed to the failure.

Communal villages did not fare much better. Although FRELIMO was able to forge a network of almost 1,400 communal villages where 1.8 million Mozambicans were living by 1982, less than 25 percent of the communal villages had agricultural cooperatives. And even in these, interest in collective plots declined precipitously. The problem was simple. There was no incentive to engage in collective labor and, despite promises, technical inputs and training from the state were minimal. Frustrated participants also found that they could earn far more by cultivating cash crops in their own gardens. Production on collective fields declined by almost 50 percent between 1979 and 1981. By 1982, cooperatives were providing less than 1 percent of production.¹⁰

Inspired by both ideological considerations and the sudden exodus of rural merchants and urban industrialists, the state also intervened to take control of marketing and manufacturing sectors. This strategy, however necessary to prevent paralysis, proved ineffectual. FRELIMO attempted to replace the network of abandoned rural stores with state-run "people's shops." But the provision of consumer goods to stock these shops received lower priority than import-

⁶The *Manchester Guardian*, April 30, 1974.

⁷*Star Weekly*, October 5, 1974.

⁸See John Saul, ed., *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985); Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* (London: Zed Press, 1984); Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 103-113.

⁹Mozambique, *Linhas Fundamentais do Plano Prospectivo Indicativo para 1981-1991* (Maputo, 1982); Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

¹⁰Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento das Cooperativas Agrícolas, "Documento Final" (August 15, 1980); Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 103-113.

ing capital goods. This decision, as well as the acute shortage of trucks, meant that shelves were often bare and that there was little incentive for peasants in the family sector or working on agricultural collectives to increase production in order to sell their commodities to the state. The industrial sector, 85 percent of which had been nationalized by 1982, experienced similar difficulties. In that year, it was operating at only 40 percent of capacity.

Mozambique's deteriorating economy left it increasingly vulnerable to pressure from South Africa. The simplest way for Pretoria to squeeze the FRELIMO government was to reduce the number of Mozambicans working the mines. Between 1975 and 1982, Mozambique lost \$3.2 billion because South Africa slashed the number of Mozambicans working in the mines from 120,000 to 45,000, and ceased its long-standing practice of remitting their wages to the Mozambican government in gold at a preferential rate. The young nation also lost \$250 million in fees because of South Africa's reduction in the level of commerce moving through the port of Maputo, which fell during the same period from approximately 600 million to 100 million tons.¹¹

At the fourth party congress held in 1983, FRELIMO announced several steps to try to reverse the economic crises. Whereas the prior congress was primarily concerned with establishing state control over strategic sectors of the economy, new policies were introduced to reverse this tendency by decentralizing power and resources. In a characteristically self-critical assessment, FRELIMO's leaders acknowledged that heavy-handed statism was stifling local peasant initiatives and grass-root impulses. Instead of continuing to grant privileges to East European-style state farms, President Machel declared that "the family sector in the countryside warrants immediate priority." The congress also endorsed Mozambique's economic opening to the West and the critical role of the interregional alliance of independent southern African states, SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference), as an instrument to challenge Pretoria's economic hegemony.¹²

The deteriorating military situation, however, made it difficult for FRELIMO to implement these new policies. By 1982, the MNR was operating in six of the country's ten provinces. It was clear that FRELIMO's

MO's leaders had underestimated the destructive capacity of the MNR, had failed to develop an effective strategy to contain the MNR and had misread Pretoria's long-term objectives.

Within six months of Mozambique's independence, South African security forces, working with their Rhodesian counterparts, had recruited Portuguese settlers and mercenaries, black and white secret police agents and former African members of the elite special forces of the colonial army to form the MNR. Several former agents of the Portuguese police, including Orlando Cristina, who became the secretary general of the MNR, also figured prominently. To this initial group were added ex-FRELIMO guerrillas who had been expelled for corruption or had left because of unfulfilled personal ambitions or political disagreements. To give the MNR visible black leadership, Andre Matzangaiza and Afonso Dhlakama, two former FRELIMO soldiers, received senior positions.¹³

After 1976, the Rhodesian government provided the MNR with arms and bases along the Mozambican border and with logistical support. In retaliation for Mozambique's imposition of United Nations-backed sanctions against Rhodesia, the latter repeatedly sent MNR bands into Mozambique to burn villages, plunder agricultural cooperatives, attack railroad lines and road traffic, disrupt commerce and raid reeducation camps, from which they recruited additional members.

In the face of these attacks and the threat of a full-scale Rhodesian invasion, Mozambique disbanded most guerrilla units and began to organize a conventional army. Military strategists believed that the Soviet-supplied tanks, artillery and jets, however antiquated, would be a more effective deterrent against a frontal assault by the Rhodesian army. Whatever the merits of the argument, by the time this new policy was implemented, Smith's regime had been defeated and Mozambique's immediate threat came from MNR guerrillas who, without their Rhodesian patron, did not crumble as FRELIMO had assumed.

Instead, the South African military transferred MNR headquarters and bases to the Transvaal, a northern province adjacent to Mozambique. Pretoria assumed complete responsibility for recruiting, training and supplying MNR forces operating within Mozambique. Shortly thereafter, MNR commander Afonso Dhlakama boasted to Portuguese journalists that South

(Continued on page 230)

¹¹Mario Azevedo, "A Sober Commitment to Liberation: Mozambique and South Africa, 1974-1979," *African Affairs*, no. 79 (1980), p. 571; Colin Murray, *Families Divided* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 30; Ministério de Porto e Transportes, Departamento de Estatísticas, *Informação Estatística* (Maputo: Ministério de Porto e Transportes, 1980), pp. 3-4.

¹²See Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 189-200, for an English translation of the economic plan of the fourth party congress.

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 176-178.

Allen Isaacman's study, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), won the Melville Herskovits Award in 1973 as the most distinguished book that year in African studies. He has published three other books and more than 40 articles on southern Africa, focusing particularly on Mozambique.

"If Biya can break the social and political power the Fulani aristocracy holds over the Christian and the Traditionalist population . . . in the north without alienating the Fulani, his chances of survival will be enhanced. . . . [And] if Biya continues at the same time to listen to the concerns of English-speaking citizens, attempts to speak English whenever he can, and increases the number of Cabinet members from former British Cameroon, . . . he will be a popular President."

The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon

BY MARIO AZEVEDO

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AHADOU Ahidjo resigned as President of the United Republic of Cameroon on November 6, 1982, having ruled the country for 22 years. The coming to power of his handpicked successor, Paul Biya, unleashed waves of political expectations among the volatile Cameroonian people, a potentially explosive mixture of more than 200 ethnic groups.

Ahidjo's resignation and his retention of the chairmanship of the Cameroon National Union made it clear that he intended to rest physically, while continuing to rule behind the scenes with Biya as his rubber stamp in charge of the day-to-day affairs of government. A Francophone lawyer, bilingual and a practicing Catholic, Biya had made no political waves while serving his term as Ahidjo's Prime Minister. Indeed, when Biya appointed a northern Muslim, Bouba Maigari, as his Prime Minister (subsequently dismissed after this ministerial position was replaced by a secretary general to the President), the continuity of Ahidjo's power and policies appeared to be a matter of fact.

In November and December, 1982, the country's attention was focused more on Ahidjo's resignation than on Paul Biya's ability to make significant national decisions. As it turned out, however, both Ahidjo and the people underestimated the quiet and humble Bulu man who would occupy Yaoundé's hilltop presidential palace. Biya methodically began to assert himself, stamping his image on the nation's life and institutions.

Genuinely concerned about inadequate freedom of expression and the press, Biya let the people speak freely. He talked of political reform that would allow more freedom in Cameroon, though he refrained from promising a multiparty system.

Mindful of the unparalleled power exerted by the north, Biya increased the number of provinces from seven to ten by splitting the north into three provinces with centers at Maroua, Garoua and Ngaoundéré, and he appointed an Anglophone governor for Garoua. In the North province, even national officials had to request "permission" from the governors and the *lamidos* (Fulani sultans) to visit or campaign. Deter-

mined to stop abuses, the new President sent southern and western officials of high integrity to the north, not to abolish the *lamidats* (Fulani kingdoms or sultanates) and the canton structure, but to eliminate feudal work (imposed on non-Muslims), illegal taxes, private jails and corporal punishment. Since the summer of 1983, for example, the governor of the Extreme Northern province has closed some 30 private prisons owned by canton chiefs and members of the National Assembly.

These measures brought confidence to the formerly powerless non-Muslim populations who now had access in Yaoundé and in their own region to air their grievances. To mute Ahidjo's criticism of these changes, Biya reshuffled the old Cabinet in June, 1983, on the eve of French President François Mitterrand's visit to Cameroon. The former President, angered and frustrated because he had not been consulted, packed his belongings and flew to exile in France. In September, 1983, Biya convened an emergency party congress in Yaoundé and was elected party chairman. Biya then called for a presidential election in January, 1984, one year before schedule. He emerged from that election as President of the republic, leaving behind the stigma of "Ahidjo's President." (The election, however, was criticized by some as hasty and not truly free, since Biya was the sole candidate.)

Thereafter, Biya posed as the President of the "Renouveau," the "New Deal." Determined to liberalize the regime, he brought young men into politics and appointed them to responsible positions, relaxed censorship and foreign investment policies, and stressed modernization of the agricultural sector rather than industry or agro-industry.

In the euphoria of freedom, dozens of newspapers sprang up across the country. (Only the government's *Cameroon Tribune* continues to circulate.) Some politicians even established short-lived parties, like the Cameroon Democratic party, founded in Douala in 1984 and led by A.S. Ngwana.

But if Biya had been predisposed to allow the establishment of a multiparty state, later events prompted

him to change his mind. On June 18, 1983, the President removed a few of the former President's men from the Cabinet. In February, 1984, he dismissed seven more ministers, his fourth Cabinet reshuffle since November, 1982. By 1984, the name of Ahidjo had become anathema and it seemed, at least on the surface, that Biya had established himself and that, as Alan Rake observed, "the former President's friends had melted away since their leader exiled himself to France."

Meanwhile, the ghost of Ahidjo continued to follow the besieged President. In early 1984, Biya announced that he would soon rotate the Republican Guard in charge of presidential security—a paramilitary body Ahidjo had created to protect himself and one that was apparently better trained and equipped than the country's armed forces. Most members of the palace Republican Guard came from Ahidjo's stronghold in the north. Amazingly, the Guard did not voice dissatisfaction with the impending presidential decree. But on April 6, 1984, after seizing the presidential palace with tanks and heavy fire, occupying the Yaoundé airport, and capturing the national radio station (which began playing martial music), the Republican Guard, led by its second in command, Colonel Ibrahim Saleh, announced a military coup. Unlike leaders of other African coups, the rebels had tapped a civilian businessman rather than a military officer as their future leader—Issa Adoun, director of the *Fond d'aide au développement rural* (Fund of Assistance for Rural Development [FONADER]), who reportedly prepared their radio message.

The rebels immediately sealed off the army unit responsible for the defense of the capital. The rebel leaders, however, misjudged the situation. First, by a trick of radio managers, their broadcast was heard only in Yaoundé and not in the provinces. Second, hiding in the palace bunker, the President was able to communicate with the armed forces. And the Yaoundé unit, although surrounded, decided to fight for the President rather than to join the rebellion. On April 7, after fierce fighting in the capital, Armed Forces Minister Gilbert Tsoungui declared the rebels defeated and asked them to surrender. The Republican Guard, however, continued to fight until April 9. The attempted coup was one of the bloodiest yet seen in Africa, causing the death of more than 1,000 people, mostly civilians who were caught in the crossfire.

Having thwarted the coup, the President broadcast a message to the nation that the crisis was over and that it was time to look to the future. In a reconciliatory move, Biya avoided blaming any one ethnic or religious group (although the culprits were well known); instead, he claimed that the attempted coup was the work of "a minority of ambitious men thirsting for power, . . . not from any particular province or origin."

To prevent a leadership crisis and to discourage

further doubts about his resoluteness, Biya ordered immediate secret trials by military tribunals. Many conspirators were summarily executed and others were given long prison sentences. (The proceedings were subsequently criticized by humanitarian organizations like Amnesty International.)

In a sense, the attempted coup moved the transition period back to square one. All that the President had said and done, as well as the future of his presidency, was at stake once again. Fortunately, the attempted coup displeased the overwhelming majority of the Cameroonian people. Cameroonians were full of praise for the country's armed forces. The President's popularity began to soar. Interviewed from exile during the attempted coup, Ahidjo denied any involvement. Nonetheless, the military tribunal implicated him in the plot and again sentenced him to death *in absentia*.

Biya moved quickly to revitalize the country's institutions, impose his image on the national life and institutionalize his New Deal concept. He pushed to convene the fourth party congress.

The location of the congress became an important issue. Aware of dissatisfaction in the Anglophone community and recalling that Anglophone Bamenda was the site where the Cameroon Union Congress (Anglophone) had decided to join Ahidjo's Cameroon National Union in August, 1966, Biya chose Bamenda to show Anglophone leaders and intellectuals that his administration cared. He had already shown concern through a massive highway and farm-to-market road project, a luxurious hotel and an airport in Bamenda. To maximize the impact of the congress, a national television network was inaugurated, and the March 21–24 proceedings at Bamenda were broadcast to the nation in French and English. The sentimental appeal of the television broadcast cannot be underestimated in any part of Africa, let alone in Cameroon.

The President traveled across the country speaking of his plans and reassuring the people that the country was no longer in crisis. In keeping with his thrust to liberalize the country's institutions, he assured people that the congress would be an open forum for their grievances. Accordingly, regional delegations were asked to prepare a document of concerns and suggested solutions. The Anglophone representatives, for example, asked for freedom of the press, the creation of industries in their neglected provinces, reorganization of the security structure, and the establishment of an English-speaking university. Other delegations spoke of issues like "political liberalization, party decentralization, and improvement of services from the government."

The congress was attended by 2,500 Cameroonian delegates from all provinces. Arriving by helicopter from Yaoundé the day before the congress, the President received a tumultuous welcome.

The atmosphere of the congress itself was a vivid reflection of the major political undercurrents in Cameroon today: the struggle between conservatives and progressives. The conservatives, among the staunchest supporters of Ahidjo, feared change and did not want to see the party "machine" dismantled or controlled by the younger technocrats and intellectuals of the University of Yaoundé, with whom Biya seems to identify.

At Bamenda, "*les hommes du Renouveau*" or *des Renouveaux* (the men of the New Deal) apparently triumphed without alienating *les hommes de l'ancien régime* (those of the old regime). Consequently, the party's name was changed from Cameroon National Union to Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC), the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement. Furthermore, the party itself was completely restructured at all levels.

As a result of the congress, more freedom was visible during the January 12–15, 1986, elections when local cells and departmental branches were to select their own candidates freely. (In the future, campaigns for the National Assembly will also allow multiple candidates.) After Bamenda, even students at the University of Yaoundé, sometimes the haven for militants, sent a message to the President, praising his academic innovations, and pledging support to him personally and to his New Deal.

To accommodate a wider selection of party members, the Central Committee was increased from 60 to 85—65 elected and 20 appointed by the chairman of the party. A significant development at Bamenda was the dismissal from the Central Committee of 28 former "barons."

The departure of these former "kingmakers" was as impressive as the arrival of several intellectuals and businessmen (*les hommes des affaires*). Five women were also named to the Central Committee.

These appointments seem to presage a progressive era. The Bamenda initiative and spirit, which institutionalized the New Deal, have continued to spark the nation's optimism. The economy is supplemented by oil revenues, which rose from 120,000 barrels a

day in 1984 to 163,000 in 1985, providing some \$700 million to the government.¹ Although the President has not permitted other parties because of their potentially explosive diversity, the degree of free expression he will continue to allow will determine his popularity as well as the nature and length of his mandate.

THE ANGLOPHONE ISSUE

Besides the economy, Biya's challenges will come from four fronts: the north, the Anglophone issue, the army, and the Bamileke economic threat. The north is, however, embarrassed at present by the failed coup engineered by its "boys" in Yaoundé. If Biya can break the social and political power the Fulani aristocracy holds over the Christian and the Traditionalist population (93 percent) in the north without alienating the Fulani, his chances of survival will be enhanced. It is interesting to note that, as party changes were announced across the country, the people of Maroua (in northern Cameroon) took to the streets, praising the President and the work of the Bamenda congress.

If Biya continues at the same time to listen to the concerns of English-speaking citizens, attempts to speak English whenever he can, and increases the number of Cabinet members from former British Cameroon (10 at present); he will be a popular President. The Anglophone intellectuals and businessmen are serious about what they think is discrimination against them. In fact, on May 7, 1985, the Anglophones presented a signed manifesto to the President that protested "the humiliating and revolting colonial status that is gradually but systematically being imposed on the English-speaking Cameroonians by the Administration."²

The manifesto asked for a new constitution to safeguard the rights of all Cameroonians and advocated the introduction of a quota system "in government, state corporations and the private sector."

THE FRENCH CONNECTION

Elements abroad, like the members of the outlawed Cameroon People's Union, based in Paris and London, could cause trouble for Biya, particularly if he makes his administration too dependent on France. Ndeh Ntumazah and General Woungli Massaga, the leaders of the party, have called the President a "French puppet" and have sarcastically claimed that, after rescinding Ahidjo's appointment as President of Cameroon, "The French President, Mr. Mitterrand, had to rush to Kamerun to personally put the crown on the head of our new king."³

The exiled Marxist-Leninist members of the Cameroon People's Union (UPC) have demanded a general amnesty, the release of all political prisoners, the reintroduction of a multiparty state, and a new constitution to be followed by free elections for the National Assembly.⁴ The Cameroon Organization to

¹Embassy of Cameroon, *Cameroon News* (Washington, D.C., December, 1984), pp. 10–11, and *Africa Contemporary Record* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1986), p. B114.

²"Memorandum Presented to the Head of State and Chairman of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement by a Joint Committee of the Elite of the North West and South West Provinces Resident in Littoral Province," Douala, Cameroon, May 7, 1985, p. 1.

³*Le Combat Kamerounais* (Paris), January, 1984, p. 5. For a detailed discussion of Cameroon's relations with France during Ahidjo's regime see Ndiva Kofele-Kale, "Cameroon and Its Foreign Relations," *African Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 319 (April, 1981), pp. 199–209.

⁴*Le Combat Kamerounais*, p. 5.

Fight for Democracy (COFD) is another exiled party based in Paris. However, the French government effectively monitors its activities. In February, 1985, for example, party members were not allowed to hold what they called "a national discussion between Cameroonians abroad."⁵ For his part, Biya has invited the COFD back, but with the clear understanding that, for now, only the RDPC is allowed to function in the republic. Biya views democracy as "an illustration of political maturity, [the] assumption of responsibility, and progress, . . . a school of tolerance where one learns to respect what is different, that is, the respect for others, their persons, their property, their rights and their opinions."⁶

BIYA'S LEADERSHIP

Biya's style confirms that he is deliberate and methodical in his approach to statesmanship. He has, for example, tried to make himself a "Man of the People." In December, 1984, he was initiated into the society of the traditional rulers of the Douala people. In January, 1985, he accepted the highest traditional title in Cameroon—the *fon* of *fons* (the chief of paramount chiefs) of the Bamenda people, conferred upon him by the *fons* of Kom, Bali, Bafut, Mankon and Nso. The President took these rites seriously, appearing for the first time in traditional robes. He was cheered by hundreds of Cameroonians. Biya uses these events to demonstrate his respect for tradition and his concern for the plight of the village farmers ruled by the *fons*. Appearing in pictures as a peasant harvesting pineapples, Biya likes to identify himself with the farmers whose problems he must solve or alleviate in order to remain politically popular.

In August, 1985, the President used the Papal visit to boost his image and popularity among the Cameroonians in general and the Catholics in particular. Although the Pope criticized the government for "arbitrary imprisonment, condemnations, . . . executions without due process, detentions for expression of opinions about inhuman conditions, tortures, disappearances,"⁷ the President emerged the winner. Africans (and Cameroonians are no exception) appreciate pomp and drama, and Biya played his cards well. For example, for the first time in any country John Paul II has visited, the Pope entered and left the capital as Cameroonian military jets roared in the skies.

Ahidjo's self-imposed exile was one of the best omens for the new President. Biya has been free to pursue his own independent course without constantly concerning himself with his predecessor's reaction. Because

of Ahidjo's exile in France, the former President's ethnic support base and constituency have been deprived of a figure to which to rally.

Finally, if Paul Biya follows his instinct toward reform and is able to balance the diverse forces that reflect the country's makeup, his political survival is likely. The ministerial reshuffling of August 24, 1985, indicates more clearly the direction his administration intends to follow: a movement away from Ahidjo's policies; the liberalization of the regime, which some analysts have called "Biya's small steps"; and the consolidation of his power.

The last major reshuffle in August, 1985, was termed by some observers "the Saturday massacre of Yaoundé"; it resulted in the removal of almost half the Cabinet members and the appointment of 14 new members, including 10 Anglophones and 4 women. In the 40-member Cabinet, made up of ministers and secretaries of state (formerly known as vice ministers), only 6 of Ahidjo's Cabinet members have been retained.

The abolition of the general secretariat to the presidency and its replacement by a presidential cabinet (of two) and by a government secretariat put into effect on November 21, 1986, caused some ministerial reshuffling. The structural changes were designed to "increase ministers' responsibility—most of their decisions until now had to receive the approval of the secretariat to the presidency."⁸

FOREIGN POLICY

Meanwhile, confident of his position, Biya has been out of the country several times, consulting leaders like Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, a close friend of Ahidjo's. Unlike his predecessor, Biya wants to see Cameroon play a more prominent role in pan-African affairs. Ultimately, his goal is to make the country a showcase of political reform and economic progress on the African continent. He has, for example, reversed Ahidjo's policy toward Chad, thus putting himself squarely against Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. He has deliberately developed closer ties with Chad's Hissène Habré, the first African President to visit Cameroon in August, 1984, after the attempted coup.

Biya has also mended the rift with neighboring Gabon, whose President visited Cameroon in October, 1984, after the establishment of a consulate in Yaoundé in March, 1984. Furthermore, as if to assert his independence from Ahidjo's close ties with Morocco, he has supported a referendum on the Western Sahara.

(Continued on page 229)

⁵*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 15, 1985, p. 7603.

⁶"President Biya's General Policy Speech," *Cameroon Tribune*, March 27, 1985, p. 9.

⁷*Africa News*, vol. 25, no. 5 (September 9, 1985), p. 8.

⁸*Africa Research Bulletin*, December 15, 1986, p. 8294.

Mario Azevedo, an African historian born in Mozambique, is author or coauthor of several books, including *Africa and Its People* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall, 1986) and has written articles on Chad, Cameroon, Mozambique and Angola.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA.

By Kurt M. Campbell. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 223 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$32.50.)

Those whose moral distaste for apartheid is tempered by geopolitical considerations should read this book. Campbell carefully examines and summarily dismisses South Africa's and its sympathizers' charge that black revolt is part of a Communist "total onslaught" against South Africa. While the Soviet Union has undoubtedly played a large role in southern Africa, Campbell finds that this "intervention" is not part of a Soviet master plan to obstruct Western access to strategic minerals or to cut off Western shipping around the Cape. In one of the most interesting sections of the book, Campbell details the quiet economic relationship between Moscow and Pretoria in the trading of diamonds, gold and platinum.

W.W.F.

KING SOLOMON'S MINES REVISITED: WESTERN INTERESTS AND THE BURDENED HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

By William Minter. (New York: Basic Books, 1986. 401 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$21.95.)

In his radical critique of the West's role in southern Africa, Minter argues that Western economic and political interests have nurtured and sheltered South Africa's white government and its policy of apartheid: "In understanding why apartheid still lives, blaming the Afrikaner is too narrow an approach." While some may bridle at Minter's polemical style, he does make a compelling case that the West—especially the United States and Great Britain—has practiced a form of benign neglect toward South Africa's blacks in the interests of anti-Communist maneuvering.

W.W.F.

ANGOLA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY.

By Keith Somerville. (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986. 207 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$30.00, cloth; \$11.95, paper.)

This straightforward, readable survey of Angola's recent history is part of a series on Marxist regimes published by Lynne Rienner. The book is rigidly structured, with sections on the most recent economic and social data and discussions of the social, political and economic systems. Somerville's account is objective and critical; readers wanting a broad introduction to Angola will find his book useful.

W.W.F.

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UGANDA: 1900–1986.

By T. V. Sathyamurthy. (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing Co., 1986. 779 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$75.50.)

Sathyamurthy's massive work on Uganda's modern history is a major addition to the information available on Uganda. As the author notes in his preface, the book has been under preparation since 1966, and has been revised and refined several times to make it a comprehensive yet readable account. The later material on the military governments after the overthrow of Idi Amin's dictatorship is not as well developed.

W.W.F.

GHANA: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY.

By Deborah Pellow and Naomi Chazan. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 238 pages, notes, photographs, bibliography and index, \$28.50.)

SOMALIA: NATION IN SEARCH OF A STATE.

By David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 198 pages, notes, photographs and index, \$28.00.)

These additions to the Westview series on the Nations of Contemporary Africa offer the general reader a brief survey and a history of two important, military-ruled nations.

W.W.F.

POLITICAL DOMINATION IN AFRICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIMITS OF POWER.

Edited by Patrick Chabal. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 211 pages, notes and index, \$12.95, paper.)

The papers in this collection assess the prospects for the emergence of democratic governments in Africa. Most of the essays focus on how statism and corrupt governments have come to dominate the African continent in the years since independence. In his introductory essay, Richard Sklar calls for "developmental democracy," a new form of democracy in which governments would make the guarantee of individual political rights the cornerstone of government programs to redress socioeconomic imbalances.

W.W.F.

AFRICAN POLITICS: CRISES AND CHALLENGES.

By J. Gus Liebenow. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 305 pages, notes and index, \$32.50, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

Liebenow, a leading Africanist, has spent more than 30 years studying Africa. In *African Politics* he

(Continued on page 234)

NIGERIA

(Continued from page 204)

of 2.4 percent in 1985 (after annual percentage declines of 8.5 and 5.5 in the GDP during the previous two years). The prospects for further improvement in 1986, however, were derailed by the sudden plunge in global oil prices, from \$28 a barrel at the start of the year to around \$10, fluctuating between \$10 and \$15 thereafter. This produced a \$2-billion shortfall in expected oil revenue in 1986. It is testimony to the rigor and timeliness of Babangida's austerity measures that this further decline in oil income did not spell disaster. But it once again left a current account deficit in the hundreds of millions of naira.

This unfortunate turn—which the country may now be overcoming, as oil prices seem to be firming up at around \$18 per barrel—makes all the more impressive the progress that the Babangida government has achieved in rationalizing its external financial situation. Forced to navigate between the international banking community and a proud and politically mobilized domestic public, the government has put a ceiling of 30 percent on its debt service payments (as a proportion of export earnings). While politically tolerable in Nigeria, this ceiling has not prevented considerable progress in negotiations with Nigeria's creditors to reschedule Nigeria's international obligations. Provisional agreements with the London and Paris Clubs of creditors were reached in 1986 and should be finalized in 1987, stretching out payments and providing a billion dollars or more in new credit. In addition, the World Bank agreed in September, 1986, to provide a \$450-million loan to help fund the foreign exchange requirements of the SFEM, and has promised \$4.3 billion in project loans over the next three years. The bitter pill of austerity has its price, but also its reward.

It is perhaps remarkable that the Babangida regime has been able to reconcile the domestic and international economic pressures and constraints it has faced in the past 18 months. As the magazine *West Africa* recently observed, Nigerians have responded positively to the economic program. "It is as if having chosen a seemingly unpopular route, and having become increasingly convinced that he was right, a leader has found unexpected . . . enthusiasm among his followers for achieving his goals."¹¹

This is not to say that Babangida's economic pol-

¹¹"Hopeful Signs from Nigeria," *West Africa*, January 12, 1987, p. 47.

¹²For an analysis of the degree to which Nigeria's "non-oil" economy has been inert, lacking "any internal engine of growth," see Sayre P. Schatz, "Pirate Capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1984).

¹³Diamond, "Nigeria in Search of Democracy," pp. 914-916.

icies are uncontroversial. Even from among those groups that appreciate, in a broad sense, the need for painful adjustments, there is growing unease over the government's continued adherence to a restrictive monetary and credit policy. Many businessmen believe that tight money is strangling the long-awaited economic expansion, while Finance Minister Chu Okongwu insists it is necessary to forestall the inflationary side-effects of devaluation, stimulate domestic savings, encourage foreign capital inflow and improve Nigeria's balance of payments. In addition, trade unions and intellectuals protest that the new budget does not spend enough on education, health and other social services for the lower and working classes who have suffered the most in recent years. Nevertheless, the regime continues to enjoy some base of popular support, not only because Nigerians know that structural change is needed in the way the economy operates, but because the President's knack for eliciting and listening to public debate has helped him steer clear of the unviable policies and disdainful tone that have undermined so many other authoritarian rulers.

POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION

By his own standard, the reconstruction of a democratic political system is no less important and compelling a goal for President Babangida than the reform and revival of the economy. And by any reckoning, the tasks are intertwined. Few doubt that the current military government has more scope than a future civilian regime (or even a military successor) to make the hard choices and demand the difficult sacrifices that are necessary if Nigeria is to develop a productive, growth-generating base of economic activity beyond the isolated stimulus of oil.¹²

There are at least three reasons why the future democratic prospect depends on the current economic adjustment. First, the swollen character of the Nigerian state has been a prime cause of each of the past two democratic failures. Because both individual and group economic advancement have depended so heavily on the control of state power and resources, the competition for power has become a desperate, "zero-sum" struggle in which the rules of the game have been trampled, and corruption has been pervasive. This must change if democracy is to work, and it will not change unless the balance of opportunities for economic advancement shifts from the public sector to the private economy.¹³

Second, a new democratic government is going to have a tough time consolidating any basis of legitimacy if it cannot deliver some degree of ordered and reasonably well distributed economic growth. This, too, will be impossible unless Babangida succeeds in stimulating agricultural production and local manufacturing while breaking the wasteful economic habits and distortions that developed during the oil boom.

Third, there is a very different race against time. By all intelligent accounts, the current softness in the world oil market (which has already tightened in the past few months) will be transformed into another global oil shortage—with the attendant high prices and boom incomes for oil exporters like Nigeria—sometime in the next few years. Whether this happens in as little as two or three years (as some predict), or as is more likely, in five to ten, it will probably come during or after the transfer of power in Nigeria to civilian rule. If the next boom hits before a solid productive base has been firmly established outside of oil, the old irresponsible and parasitic behavior will reassert itself with a vengeance; and most of the people will be envious, resentful and embittered.¹⁴ This bitterness will be focused on the politicians of the next corrupt republic and will almost certainly bring them down again.

In fact, it is the vivid memory of such political self-aggrandizement in the Second Republic that injects a sharp and disturbing ambivalence into the current debate over how and when to stage the transition to democratic government. At the beginning of 1986, President Babangida announced that the military would hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government by October 1, 1990; and he appointed a 17-member "political bureau" to coordinate a national dialogue on how to negotiate that transition and structure the new government. The bureau was given until the end of 1987 to solicit proposals from the public and offer its own recommendations. Although the bureau, which recently submitted its report, is believed to have recommended another multiparty presidential system, there remains widespread cynicism about politicians and party politics.

As happened during the "great debate" over the constitutional structure of the Second Republic, many Nigerians are questioning whether political parties are necessary and appropriate for democracy in their country. Some have called for various forms of "diarchy" or shared rule between elected civilians and military officers.¹⁵ These carry the danger of permanently expanding the military's role in society and limiting democratic accountability and responsiveness.¹⁶ While the political bureau has apparently recognized that political parties are the indispensable instrument for interest articulation, aggregation and representation in modern democracies, and while neither the major-

ity of the people nor Babangida himself want to see military rule prolonged much beyond 1990, the lack of faith in parties and politicians hangs like a dark cloud over the political future. It was precisely this enduring cynicism (along with evidence that some of the politicians from the Second Republic were already beginning to organize secretly in defiance of the political ban) that led Babangida to ban the former politicians from future political involvement for a period of ten years.

This lingering cynicism has complicated the effort to resolve the issue of accountability for the misdeeds of the previous civilian regime. In response to recommendations of two judicial tribunals appointed in late 1985, the regime reduced the sentences (typically by more than half) of more than 50 persons convicted of corruption, and acquitted 12 completely. Forty-nine (including 12 former civilian governors) were banned for life from seeking elective office. In July (after a delay of several months), the government approved the recommendation of a separate panel that former President Shehu Shagari and Vice President Alex Ekwueme be released from detention, but banned both of them from politics for life. At the same time, 100 other politicians were cleared of all charges (some to the dismay of a skeptical press and public) and 800 were ordered to be tried for corruption by a special judicial tribunal. It remains to be seen what, if anything, will come of these new trials, but many Nigerians believe that former politicians have paid too lightly and that too many have not paid at all for the money they stole and the destruction they caused.

But this is not the most difficult political challenge facing the Babangida regime. Ironically, while he has won support for his economic policies, his liberal image has begun to sour in the past year in a way that could weaken the popular basis of his rule and complicate his capacity to manage a successful transition to democracy. This process may have begun with the execution in March, 1986, of 10 officers convicted by a military tribunal of plotting a coup to overthrow the regime, even though news of the plot had been greeted with revulsion by a coup-weary public. Later in the year, many groups objected to the blanket ban on the politicians, and to the decision—rescinded under pressure from the bar and the press—to extend from three months to six the length of time a person could be detained without trial for reasons of "state security" under Decree Number 2, which was never repealed. This was only one of several disturbing signs that the repressive security mentality of the Buhari-Idiagbon regime survives in the current regime, even if it is not obviously shared by the President.

The most serious political crisis for the regime came on May 23, 1986, when police went on a rampage at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, killing several students (some estimates were over 20) and injuring many

¹⁴On the consequences of the previous oil boom, see Richard Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1978).

¹⁵See "The Diarchy Proposition," *West Africa*, April 1, 1985, pp. 610-611; "The Diarchy Debate," *West Africa*, May 13, 1985, pp. 937-938; and "The Political Debate," *West Africa*, April 14, 1986, pp. 768-769.

¹⁶Larry Diamond, "Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic," *African Affairs*, April, 1987.

more. The police had been summoned to the campus by the vice chancellor in response to peaceful student protests, and they reportedly fired indiscriminately on the students. The news of the killings provoked outrage and sympathy demonstrations on a number of other university campuses, leading to further confrontation and violence and several more student casualties. Although the government immediately appointed a commission of inquiry, its liberal reputation was further damaged when it quashed a planned sympathy demonstration by the Nigerian Labour Congress on June 4 and detained 7 of its leaders for 11 days. In its July White Paper on the commission report, the government dissolved all student unions for the remainder of the academic year and rejected the recommendation that the police not be sent to campuses with lethal weapons in the future.

In October, the nation was further stunned by the assassination by parcel bomb of one of Nigeria's most talented, innovative and fearlessly independent journalists, Dele Giwa, editor-in-chief of *Newsweek* magazine. The 39-year-old Giwa founded the magazine in January, 1985, with three other leading newspaper editors, and it quickly became a popular sensation. Giwa's biting commentaries and relentless pursuit of the truth through investigative reporting had frequently landed him in trouble with the police and the government.

Circumstantial evidence, including their extraordinary defensiveness and intimidating warnings to the press, links top security officials to the assassination. But whether or not elements of the state security establishment were involved in Giwa's assassination, it is clear that the authoritarian impulse did not die with the overthrow of the Buhari-Idiagbon regime. No doubt, military and security officials in key positions remain apprehensive about any liberalization, and particularly the mobilization by trade union, student and other popular organizations that it might unleash. These officials would prefer to see such interest groups tightly controlled and licensed by the state through some kind of corporatist arrangement. They share with some intellectuals and bureaucrats a deep distrust and dislike for the turmoil and divisiveness of a multiparty system. They value order and stability over freedom, and probably would prefer to institutionalize some kind of bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.

The democratic transition to which President Babangida has committed himself reflects the pluralistic character and liberal aspirations of the country, and would seem for now to be difficult to reverse. But as with most other transitions in which the military leaves by its own choice and timetable, its completion

is far from guaranteed and the success of any future democratic system is far from assured. The issue of constitutional structure is important: the new constitution must put in place more effective and autonomous structures for checking and correcting the abuse of power.¹⁷ But public accountability will be difficult to institutionalize in a new democratic regime if its predecessor has not begun to establish a precedent. This is why the current military regime must install an independent apparatus that can monitor its conduct in office. It is also why so many Nigerians believe it is important that Dele Giwa's killers be found and convicted. ■

SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 200)

them, when it can, to control the pace and direction of change. At base, however, the government cannot hold back the tide—the demands for majority rule and for black power.

THE WHITE RESPONSES

In turn, the strategies for dealing with black resistance bedevil and divide the white citizenry. The white polity is increasingly fragmented at three levels.

First, at the partisan-parliamentary level, what was once a relatively neat two-party system, a liberal opposition against a conservative government, has become complicated by the entry of two parties to the right of the ruling NP. Both the Conservative party (CP) and the Herstigte Nasionale party (HNP) have performed well in by-elections and, as a result, have forced the NP to try to undermine their appeal. The government's gestures and concessions to the right make serious reform nearly impossible. The right wants to preserve racism and apartheid. The 1987 elections in May should be important. The NP is assured a majority in the white Parliament, but the election will reveal the gravity of the right-wing threat. It is possible that the CP or a CP-HNP alliance (a formal electoral merger was rejected in late January) may replace the liberal Progressive Federal party as the official opposition.

Outside Parliament, in the second arena of white politics, the government's challenge from the right is serious and sometimes violent. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a neo-Nazi movement, managed to break up an NP meeting in Pietersburg in May and, in response, President Pieter Botha addressed an NP rally in Potgietersrust behind razor wire and rows of armed police. Perhaps these events exaggerate right-wing support, but the NP has seen its majorities shrink, first in the rural Transvaal constituencies and later in blue collar urban areas. The NP seems confused about its next step.

Finally, there is a great deal of jockeying with regard to policy within the government and the NP itself and

¹⁷For some specific suggestions on constitutional change, see *ibid.*

in the executive branch. The security establishment has taken center stage on security matters, and increasingly it has brought the government to see security ramifications in virtually all policy areas.¹⁵ The civil service cannot always be counted upon to implement policy directives.

Also at the central government level, the State Security Council has assumed the role of an inner cabinet. The SSC implements policy through its Works Committee and various interdepartmental committees. The SADF, the Department of Defense, Military Intelligence, the National Intelligence Service and the Security Police exercise inordinate influence. Even at provincial, regional and local levels, these groups are powerful. The comprehensive network of the National Security Management System permits the security forces to operate vigorously in policymaking and in policy coordination and implementation. This "shadow state structure" exists alongside the government's bureaucracy. It is responsible only to superior security bodies in the hierarchy.¹⁶

Thus, Parliament, political parties, and the Cabinet are in danger of being eclipsed. The struggle for South Africa looks more and more like a frontal contest between the militant forces of resistance and revolution and the mobilized and unbending armed forces of the status quo. The ultimate polarization of politics may be delayed, deflected or complicated by the appeals of those who wish to seek a less violent resolution, but these groups are losing credibility and influence. Such groups may be necessary later, to facilitate a solution after the struggle has run its course. But for now, they seem powerless to prevent the violence all sides profess to abhor.

If this analysis is correct, South Africa is perilously near the slippery slope of full-scale violence, where advocates of moderation and compromise themselves become the targets, regarded as traitors to their respective peoples and causes, and where the management of violence becomes the coin of power. ■

¹⁵Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

¹⁶*Weekly Mail*, vol. 2, no. 39 (October 3-8, 1986), pp. 1, 12-13. The chief of the SADF argues against this view in the *Weekly Mail*, vol. 2, no. 45 (November 14-20, 1986), pp. 10-11. See also Barry Dean, "Control by Cabal," *Leadership* (Johannesburg), vol. 5, no. 4 (1986), pp. 58-62.

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 196)

major focus of public and private endeavors in the region. Zimbabwe has committed approximately 9,000 troops to guard the route, and Tanzania has reportedly committed at least 1,200 men in Mozambique. Malawi has offered sanctuary to RENAMO insurgents, although this aid was scaled back when the

front-line states threatened retaliation. Under these circumstances, the Mozambican conflict has the potential of escalating into a general regional conflict, with possible external intervention.

DILEMMAS OF UNITED STATES POLICY

It is impossible to develop an effective policy toward South Africa without taking into account the broader regional context. U.S. officials must recognize that efforts to build positive relationships with South Africa have been significantly damaged by the failure to deliver a long-promised settlement in Namibia and the decision to provide military support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in Angola.⁸

That statement by the Advisory Committee's report on South Africa highlights the basic paradox of United States policy: at the time when the United States took a historic stand against apartheid, which should have dramatically enhanced its prestige and influence in the region as a whole, it supported a host of conflicting policies which, in African eyes, place United States influence in serious question.

At a January meeting of ministers representing the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)—an economic group consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe—bafflement was expressed over contradictory American policies toward the Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique. While the United States had committed more than \$5 million to help Mozambique rebuild its sabotaged railroad lines, it vowed to aid Savimbi's rebels, who destroyed Angola's key rail link.

That is not the greatest inconsistency. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Marxist Angola, but it provides some economic support to Marxist Mozambique. However, aid restrictions permit assistance only to the private sector, in spite of Maputo's economic reforms, its bids for foreign and private investment and its pragmatic approach to South Africa.

Contradictions also underlie United States relations with Zimbabwe, a country that professes Marxism but has adopted a mixed economy and promotes racial reconciliation. In July, 1986, Washington ended a \$20-million aid program after a junior member of Zimbabwe's Cabinet criticized United States policy at an American Independence Day reception while former United States President Jimmy Carter walked out in protest. Although the Zimbabwean government was responsible for a rude breach of diplomatic protocol, the United States overreacted. State Department officials said that the refusal of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe to apologize led to the aid cutoff, which was announced just as Mugabe was playing host to leaders of the 101-member Nonaligned Movement in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe.

The United States had been Zimbabwe's largest aid donor, providing \$350 million since independence

⁸"A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa," p. 15.

in 1980. Zimbabwe's political and economic policies have been praised by the West, and Zimbabwe is considered the linchpin of the SADCC, with the region's second strongest economy and the second strongest army (trained by the United Kingdom) after South Africa. Zimbabwe has described the aid cut as petty, another sign of the confusion in United States policy.⁹ James Rollings, the new United States ambassador to Zimbabwe and a former Union Carbide executive, has improved relations to some extent, but the Reagan administration still views Zimbabwe with suspicion because of its pronounced anti-United States voting record in the United Nations. Yet a resumption of aid to Zimbabwe is essential if the United States is to be effective in carrying out its antiapartheid policy and combating Soviet and Cuban influence in the region.

The Zimbabwean aid cutoff raises the larger question of United States assistance to southern Africa, currently in a state of grave uncertainty because of severe budget restrictions on all United States government expenditures. An initial offer to provide the six front-line states with \$500 million in economic assistance over a five-year period to diminish their dependence on South Africa has been cut back to \$50 million for 1987, provided Congress approves additional funds on a year-to-year basis. At a meeting of the SADCC in Botswana in February, 1987, United States Agency for International Development (AID) administrator M. Peter McPherson said the Reagan administration was offering a package of \$93 million (\$50 million in 1987, \$43 million in 1988) over the next 18 months.¹⁰ But even that amount has been questioned within the administration (notably by the Office of Management and Budget), and may be in trouble in Congress, where conservatives have expressed objections to earmarking funds for Mozambique. Moreover, the administration's proposed aid sets aside only one-third of the amount for transportation, none of it for the vital Beira Corridor, the most important project in the region, which European nations have backed with approximately \$200 million.

All told, Washington has provided some \$1.2 billion in aid to southern Africa since 1980. Support for the Beira Corridor would represent a clear gesture of solidarity with the southern African nations. Instead, the United States offers piecemeal assistance to fragmented projects in a region where the impact of aid is diluted by executive and legislative restrictions that rule out direct bilateral programs in Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and, to a large extent, Mozambique, the most important political actors in SADCC.

Organized in 1980, SADCC's nine members, six of whom are landlocked, represent a population of 70

million. The organization has estimated that it has lost \$10 billion because of Pretoria's destabilization policies over the last five years—more than all the foreign aid received by the region and more than one-third of its total export earnings. It is ironic that the leaders of the front-line states, led by Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe, chairman of the Nonaligned Movement for the next three years, have expressed an interest in visiting the United States and talking to President Reagan, but have not been formally invited. Yet when these leaders were meeting in Harare in January, 1986, the United States was treating Jonas Savimbi, a guerrilla leader backed by South Africa, with the full diplomatic protocol of an established head of state.

PROSPECTS

As the situation in southern Africa grows more critical every year, the role of the United States seems to be growing more controversial. Black African leaders are skeptical, and so are white South Africans. South Africa's ruling National party is campaigning on a platform of anti-Americanism for the whites-only election to be held on May 6. Foreign Minister Roelof Botha has described the report of the Advisory Committee on South Africa as a "ghastly attack" and has warned that if Shultz wants to come to South Africa to discuss it he will be lucky to get past the airport's arrival lounge.

The United States cast its veto in the Security Council in February, 1987, to block the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa similar to those approved by the United States Congress last fall. Had the United States voted for the measure, it would have been consistent with the recommendation of the Advisory Committee to internationalize existing sanctions. Senator Richard Lugar (R., Ind.), who headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year and was a chief proponent of sanctions, stated: "It strikes me as the wrong call. Clearly our policy was one that could only be successful if our major allies in other countries share in that idea of limited economic sanctions."¹¹

The continuing debate over South African sanctions is indicative of continuing ambiguity over United States policy objectives. To the average American, there is no contradiction between opposition to Communist domination (as illustrated by aid to Savimbi) and opposition to racial oppression (as illustrated by sanctions against South Africa). But in Africa, these are mixed signals. What African leaders find particularly distressing is the American emphasis on the remote threat of Soviet domination at a time when they are confronting a clear and present danger from South Africa.

American policy has concentrated on allaying white fears without due regard for legitimate black insecur-

⁹FBI, January 23, 1987. Also see "Sanctions and Survival," *The New Yorker*, February 2, 1987, pp. 74-90.

¹⁰*Weekly Mail*, February 13-19, 1987.

¹¹*The New York Times*, February 25, 1987.

ities. Dennis Worrall, the former South African ambassador to the United Kingdom who resigned his post in order to run as an independent in the South African elections, noted in his departure statement that "the road to black liberation lies through white African security," echoing the central premise of constructive engagement.¹² Although there is a measure of truth in this assertion, the opposite may be equally asserted: the road to white African security lies through black liberation. What both statements point to is the fact that white and black attitudes are governed less by ideology than by interests.

Washington must satisfy two preconditions to restore its credibility in southern Africa: it must recognize that a United States response to regional issues is imperative to sustain its antiapartheid policy in South Africa, and it must separate issues of global ideology from bilateral and regional interests. Specifically, the United States must improve its relations with Zimbabwe, whose record of economic performance and racial reconciliation deserves strong support; it must respond to the urgent economic needs of Mozambique, on whom the welfare of southern Africa as a whole depends; it must deal energetically with the trade and transportation problems of the region, including the vital Beira project; and it must end aid to UNITA, resuming the role of mediator rather than serving as a military supporter of insurgencies. These new directions would redress uneven power balances, reduce inconsistencies in American policy and significantly enhance the influence of the West. ■

¹²FBIS, February 18, 1987.

GHANA

(Continued from page 208)

are 20 + percent for the year 1986).

Nonetheless, the effects of this inflation on a Ghanaian population impoverished by previous hyperinflations have been painful and have made Rawlings's economic program highly unpopular among many Ghanaians. Still, the price of local foods, on which most urban Ghanaians spend up to 75 percent of their earnings, has remained relatively stable since 1984. Domestic production of maize, cassava and rice recovered dramatically in 1984 and 1985, exceeding the high production levels of the early 1970's, although some other major cereal and root crops remain below the levels reached in the late 1970's. The government has made sharp reductions in the budget deficits and has financed the deficits by noninflationary external and internal borrowing. It has reduced the budget in part by dramatic improvements in tax collections, but it has also been forced to shift the burden of funding some major services to consumers, in particular health and education, which were previously paid for by the central government. In 1986, the government paid

only 50 percent of the wages of local council employees, which generated some layoffs and led to renewed efforts at local tax mobilization.

The government's need to contain its expenditures—an IMF condition for loans—has created repeated conflicts with the labor movement and the TUC. As the representative of a labor force whose real wages have fallen by well over 50 percent in the last eight years, the TUC has been the most persistent and politically formidable critic of PNDC policies. The PNDC itself has limited choices and confronts a public labor force bloated by prior regimes. The government, following devaluations, has consistently sought to minimize the size of wage increases by fiat. The TUC has consistently argued for higher wages through negotiations, and has tried to use the government rate as a base for renewed bargaining with other employers. The state has given the largest increases to the minimum wage workers, but this has led to a compression of wages between the lowest and highest paid in the civil service (a ratio of 1:1.8 in 1985), a morale-destroying situation (it was increased to 1:5.7 in 1986).

The government has started to lay off workers, but termination benefits won by unions have made this prohibitively expensive. Only 27,000 employees were laid off in 1985; the government called out soldiers to avert massive protests because unemployment benefits were not paid in one installment. In 1986, the government suddenly announced that employers would no longer pay leave allowances—calculated at 10 to 15 percent of wages. In the face of widespread protests and strike threats, the government withdrew this decision. The large number of allowances, which are calculated as percentages of salaries, creates wage disparities, but the unions oppose all government attempts to intervene in the realm of collective bargaining.

The government is unable to raise incomes rapidly, and the level of poverty among even middle-level workers has driven large numbers to fraud, theft, and embezzlement on a fairly large scale, as Ghanaian newspaper accounts of arrests, dismissals and public tribunal proceedings testify. In the last year massive fraud was discovered among many school and education officers and among employees in the Auditor and Accountant General Department.

Since 1985–1986, the government has actively considered selling off or closing down state corporations that do not operate profitably. Decisions on "privatization" will draw the opposition of both the radicals and the unions, which are certain such sales will lead to wholesale dismissals.

LEGITIMACY

After five years in power, Rawlings's PNDC lacks political legitimacy in the eyes of many important

political segments on the left and right. Many Ghanaians appreciate the relative political order and the renewal of economic growth. But for members of the left, workers and trade unionists and ordinary Ghanaians, Rawlings has departed fundamentally from the ideals for which he seized power: the right of all Ghanaians to basic essentials, the right to education and health care and, most of all, the right to participate in decisions over their lives. The leftist intelligentsia and a wide current of nationalist opinion believe he has also betrayed the revolution by seeking Ghana's economic salvation through the IMF and its orthodox, market-reliant economic policies and a concomitant reduction in the regulatory role of the state. The left and the unions share with the right and centrist political segments an anger with the regime's continuing authoritarianism, especially the military's intermittent brutalization of civilians and the use of detention to silence political foes. And the regime's failure to permit or to encourage political organizations that link the grass roots with the nation's political system means that the regime cannot engender support and compliance from a major section of the populace.

There is a powerful and persistent democratic ethos in Ghana that is opposed to Rawlings's authoritarianism. The regime does not want the return of a multiparty representative system, seeing in it the source of Ghana's past mismanagement. The PNDC-appointed National Commission on Democracy has been at work for several years, buying the regime time and trying to come up with some ideas for democratic representation that do not involve a return to the Western parliamentary and multiparty model, but no workable ideas have emerged thus far.

In Rawlings's fifth anniversary speech on December 31, 1986, he announced that new local elections would be held before June, 1987, and that his government would seek a mandate for its medium- and long-term economic goals. It is doubtful that any government could have launched economic reform programs like Rawlings's if there had been democratic rule; previous governments have shied away from devaluation and budget cuts in the face of popular dissent. But the Rawlings regime must permit free debate again and needs to allow wider political participation if it wishes to be regarded as ruling legitimately. ■

KENYA

(Continued from page 212)

called Kobil. Moi is involved in a partnership that has reportedly bought a controlling interest in Firestone's Kenyan subsidiary, Marshall's Peugeot, the country's largest car dealership, and Fox Theatres, which has a monopoly on importing films to Kenya. It has also been confirmed that Moi and his partners attempted, without success, to buy out the Kenyan

subsidiary of Barclay's Bank. (Barclay's reportedly threatened to leave the country if another buyout was attempted.)

Undaunted, Kenya's political elite began opening its own banks, undercapitalized and poorly run institutions that took the public's money and made huge unsecured loans to the banks' directors. Three of these banks have already failed, taking with them the savings of farmers and small businessmen. The biggest bank to collapse was the Continental Bank, which lent \$23 million in unsecured loans to its directors. This was a Kikuyu-owned institution and Vice President Mwai Kibaki was one of the bank's directors. Earlier another Kikuyu-dominated bank, the Rural-Urban Credit Finance Company, also collapsed. Many Kenyans believe that the government engineered the fall of both institutions in its relentless campaign to sap Kikuyu financial power. Indeed, the government controls most of the cash in the country through government-owned corporations like the Coffee Board and the Tea Board, and government manipulation can easily decide the fate of financial institutions and many businesses.

There is no conflict of interest law in Kenya, so it is legal for government officials to engage in business if they want to—and all of them do. The distinction between public and private interests has become hopelessly confused, and the government in Kenya sometimes becomes an appendage to the commercial interests of government officials. "In terms of corruption, Moi now ranks a close second to [Zaire's President] Mobutu," a Western diplomat in Nairobi said, "and he's not done yet."

Though Kenyans were aware of the corruption that flourished under Kenyatta, they know that corruption is different today. Kenyatta ran a vast patronage system like the Chicago political machine. The top officials skimmed the money but a lot of it was passed down. Favors were given out. Politicians stayed in office by helping people with their problems. "Under Kenyatta everybody stole, and everybody was encouraged to get big," a Nairobi shopkeeper said, echoing a sentiment often heard in Nairobi. "Now people are afraid to get too big, because if they do the President will take their businesses."

Beyond corruption, other factors align Kenyans against their government. The government has shown itself unwilling or unable to address the problems of the landless, rural and urban. For the agricultural people of Kenya and other parts of Africa, land is life. It is necessary not only for growing food but for giving a man a sense of identity and self-worth. Kenya's revolution against the British was fought not in the name of nationalism, but in the cause of land. Many of the problems that the freedom fighters fought for remain unredressed.

But there is no more open land in Kenya. Only

one-third of the land in the country is arable and all of that is taken. Meanwhile, government officials fence off vast estates while the landless look on. Kenya's population of 20 million is growing at over 4 percent per year, the world's highest rate. As the land shortage gets worse, people flock to the cities, where no jobs exist. Violent crime, endemic to the large cities of Nairobi, Mombassa and Kisumu, is increasingly appearing in small towns and even in rural areas. Last year when an MP from Nakuru district complained about crime in his district he was threatened with expulsion from the party. The government deals with its problems by not talking about them.

The rise of dissent and resentment has certainly been mitigated by Kenya's healthy economy during the last two years. But this appears to be coming to an end. The failure of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) to come to terms with consumers led to a sharp fall in coffee futures during the first months of 1987. The price of oil is on the rise. And Kenya's tourist industry is threatened by reports that the fatal disease AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) is rampant in the country.

Kenya's tradition of stability is threatened as never before. And it is on that stability that Kenya's economic fortunes have been built. At the same time, the monopolistic ambitions of the elite appear to have dampened the entrepreneurial verve of Kenya's Asians and Kikuyu, who have traditionally controlled commerce in the country.

Reports of human rights violations and corruption have increased tensions between Kenya and its two main Western allies, Britain and the United States. In January, the chairman of the United States Congress Foreign Relations Africa Subcommittee, Representative Howard Wolpe (D., Mich.), visited Kenya to investigate charges of human rights violations. Despite the Kenyans' promise of cooperation, a meeting between Wolpe and dissidents (including Charles Rubia) was disrupted by Kenyan authorities.

Moi said that the views expressed by Wolpe were those of Kenyan dissidents on the congressman's payroll and that the praise Moi had earlier received from United States Secretary of State George Shultz on his January visit to Kenya was a better indication of the true sentiment in the United States. Wolpe responded that large amounts of United States assistance to Kenya were jeopardized by Kenya's failure to deal with human rights violations.

Several days after the congressman left, Moi decreed that government officers, members of Parliament, and Cabinet ministers must seek permission from the ministry of foreign affairs before visiting foreign embassies or high commissions in Nairobi. The government also initiated moves to "thin out" the foreign press contingent based in Nairobi, blaming it for inaccurate and misleading reporting.

While dissatisfaction with the government in Kenya is pervasive, Kenyans have also learned some harsh lessons from their neighbors. In Uganda they have seen coup after coup lead to more and more misery. In Ethiopia, they have watched a socialist state lead to repression and starvation. And in Tanzania they have seen President Julius Nyerere reluctantly abandon his utopian socialist policies for more pragmatic policies. Kenyans fear a military takeover, and they fear that continued corruption and dissent will soon force the military to act, leading either to a right-wing or to a left-wing coup.

It is likely that if Moi had pressed on with the promise of political reform that initiated his presidency, he would have assured his power. But the measures he has taken to entrench his rule have only weakened it. And the greed that has led him to dominate the country's economy has jeopardized Kenya's economic progress.

The problems of landlessness, unemployment and uncontained population growth and the lack of economic opportunity that demanded Moi's attention in 1978 have only become worse. And now even the facade of prosperity and stability has begun to crumble. ■

CAMEROON

(Continued from page 220)

Motivated by the need to improve the country's economy, Biya has reestablished Cameroon's cordial relations with France, damaged by Ahidjo's behavior as an exile in France before and immediately after the attempted coup. He has also opened up channels for closer relations with the United States, West Germany and Britain through personal visits in 1985-1986; he has likewise tapped the Soviet Union, Japan and China, hoping to minimize dependence on one power.

THE NEW DEAL'S ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Biya's New Deal envisions a reinvigorated domestic economy with ample room for foreign investment. An offshoot of the economic philosophy of "planned liberalism," the New Deal gives high priority to developing agriculture; Cameroon is self-sufficient in food and has been able to export surplus crops in recent years, notwithstanding the drought of the 1970's and 1980's.

The New Deal encourages light and medium-size industries (like breweries and textiles) and aims to improve communication networks at an unprecedented accelerated pace through projects like the construction of a third international airport at Yaoundé (in addition to airports at Douala and Garoua), the realignment of the railway between Douala and Yaoundé, the expansion of the port of Douala, and the paving of the major roads (being undertaken mostly by Italy).

The new liberal investment code stipulates that

investment must be based on local needs and that the personnel must eventually be "Cameroonized." Investors are urged not to export all their capital but to make provisions for a slow transfer of technology to Cameroon. The new code is designed to attract investment and spur production and to reduce, simultaneously, the risk of multinational corporate control over the state apparatus and the national economy.

The philosophy and the goals of the New Deal have been incorporated in the 1986–1991 sixth five year plan, which allocates 25 percent of its budget (some 77.83 billion CFA* francs) to the rural sector, namely, agriculture, fishing, livestock and forests. Indeed, the new economic order is implicit in Biya's motto: "rigor, efficiency, and pragmatism."⁹

The impact of Biya's economic policy since 1982 is already being felt. In terms of investments, loans, grants and foreign aid, for example, Cameroon's economy is functioning well, and the country has a top credit rating in the international market. Cameroon's balance of payments is positive.¹⁰ In 1986, most West European countries, the Soviet Union, China and Japan showed increased interest in funding Cameroonian projects or in providing loans and grants to its financial institutions.

France, of course, spends millions of dollars yearly in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance. In March, 1986, for instance, it lent Cameroon some 100 million CFA francs to purchase a thermal power station. In fact, two-thirds of all foreign investment in Cameroon is French.

Economic planners have allocated, out of the country's 1,000 billion CFA franc budget, 490 billion CFA francs for investment in the productive sectors.¹¹ Oil revenues, kept secret until 1984, are not included in the general budget, but have been used to fund specific projects and to pay part of the external debt (which only rose from \$823.3 million in 1977 to \$1,780 million by the end of 1985). Furthermore, unlike most African countries, Cameroon does not borrow abroad to finance its budget. Overall, since 1981 Cameroon has experienced a 7 to 10 percent annual economic growth rate (10 percent in 1985).

It is worth noting also that even though Cameroon's fifth five year plan achieved only 86 percent of its goals (mainly because of price fluctuations for cocoa, coffee, cotton, and bananas and because of drought), the country's wealth increased, contributing to a decline in infant mortality from 117 to 105

*Editor's note: Cameroon belongs to the Franc Zone, a group of Central and West African countries whose currencies are linked with the French franc. The zone's currency is the CFA (Communauté financière africaine—African Financial Community) franc.

⁹Gilbert Moutard, "Quelles chances pour la politique du président Biya?" *Afrique Contemporaine*, no. 139 (July–September, 1986), pp. 28–31.

¹⁰*Africa Contemporary Record*, p. B316.

¹¹*Africa Research Bulletin*, March 31, 1986, p. 8119.

per 1,000, to an increase in life expectancy from 50 to 52 and to a growth of 3.8 percent in the per capita real revenue.

CONCLUSION

Key economic indicators seem to presage a bright future for Cameroon, despite the 20 percent inflation rate, the rapid population growth rate (Cameroon's population will double and reach 20 million by the year 2000), the relatively low productivity of some of the parastatal enterprises, the periodic droughts, contraband, and the growing exodus of individuals from the countryside to the urban centers. Most reassuring, however, are the country's abundant natural resources and the managerial skills and the effectiveness Cameroonian planners have demonstrated. Aware of the unwise oil policies followed by Nigeria, for example, Cameroon's leaders have followed a policy of national austerity.

On the political level, Biya has apparently weathered the storm and may be one of the shrewdest and most determined statesmen Africa has ever seen. In fact, the recent release of dozens of political prisoners, including well-known former Economic Affairs Minister Victor Kanga and Cameroon's perhaps best-known lawyer, Gorji Dinka, as well as others who were allegedly implicated in the attempted coup or were members or sympathizers of the outlawed Cameroon People's Union (UPC), has enhanced Biya's reputation as an honest man.

Finally, Biya's actions in removing Cabinet members and the political changes that took place during the January, 1986, party elections remind the political barons that the *ancien régime* is slowly waning. In fact, these elections decided the fate of 135,000 cell leaders, 27,000 local branch chairmen, 700 subsection chairmen, and 149 departmental section chairmen. The elections affected 51 percent of the male and 57 percent of the female departmental section leadership, and resulted in the removal of 71 percent of all party leaders—changes that Biya and the Central Committee accepted, despite the fact that some of the new party leaders (like Jean-Jacques Ekindi of Wouri and Douala, Thomas Melone of Littoral Sanaga and Edea, and Theodore Mayi Matip of Nyong and Kelle) were former members of the "radical" Cameroon People's Union. Significantly, those Anglophone candidates who appeared to advocate separatism were defeated, a political development that seems to foreshadow political democracy, national unity and the survival of the President.

MOZAMBIQUE AND THE REGIONAL CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 216)

African Defense Minister Magnus Malan had made him a colonel and assured him that "your army is

now part of the South African Defense Force."¹⁴

Mozambique was unprepared for the MNR's resurgence in late 1980. FRELIMO, which had been so effective as a guerrilla movement during the armed struggle, found itself trying to contain guerrillas (who had sophisticated logistical support from Pretoria) with a relatively inexperienced, poorly equipped conventional army relying on outdated Soviet equipment.

ESCALATING THE CONFLICT

Pretoria's decision to take direct control of the MNR was a critical component of its regional destabilization policy, which had begun to take shape in the mid-1970's. Because of the independence of Angola and Mozambique, powerful forces in the South African military and security apparatus argued that the prevailing laager or wagon-train mentality was defeatist and inflexible. They called for an aggressive economic and military offensive to ensure Pretoria's hegemony over the region. The defeat of the Smith regime in 1979 and the formation of the SADCC shortly thereafter reinforced this line of reasoning. In rapid succession, Pretoria escalated its support for insurgents fighting the front-line governments of Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Angola, and imposed a variety of economic sanctions against its African neighbors.

But Mozambique was to be the principal terrain of struggle, and the MNR was the principal instrument for implementing Pretoria's policy of regional destabilization. At a meeting between MNR leader Dhlakama and Colonel Van Nierok of South African security in 1980, the latter ordered the MNR to extend its activity to the strategic central and southern provinces, thereby discouraging Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries from exporting their commodities through Maputo and Beira.¹⁵

Initially, South Africa trained MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal, and air-dropped supplies and provided logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique. Mozambique's long coastline is ideally

suited for naval landings, which became more frequent. Captured MNR documents suggest that this was the preferred route, because Mozambique's fledgling navy could not patrol effectively. In addition to the small arms, mortars, mines and anti-aircraft weaponry, Mozambican officials acknowledged that the MNR received communications equipment that was far more sophisticated than that available to their own forces. This enabled MNR bands to maintain contact with South Africa, whose reconnaissance planes flew inside Mozambique to provide valuable information on Mozambican troop movements.¹⁶

By 1983, Western diplomats in Maputo estimated MNR membership at between 5,000 and 10,000. Many MNR recruits seem to have been coerced into joining. Nevertheless, Mozambique's serious economic problems made MNR recruitment easier. Extensive droughts, which the MNR attributed to alienated ancestors, the Mozambican government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane provided fertile ground for MNR overtures. So did the MNR's manipulation of tribal divisions and appeals to Shona chiefs, spirit mediums and "traditional" Shona values.¹⁷

Whatever the initial attraction of these appeals, MNR plundering and increasing terrorism quickly alienated the rural population, which, above all else, wanted to be left alone. The MNR's tactics, together with its reliance on narrow tribal appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with FRELIMO'S Marxist strategy. Apart from its anti-Communist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has rarely made any effort to organize the peasants in those areas in which it operates.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the MNR has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies. Between 1980 and 1983, Zimbabwe redirected 50 percent of its exports from South African ports to Mozambican ports. Despite the appreciably lower cost of shipping through Maputo and Beira, escalating MNR attacks convinced many Zimbabwean companies to continue relying on South African ports.

As the economic stakes increased, South African commandos no longer bothered to maintain their facade as "instructors." South African commandos, for example, destroyed the strategic bridge across the Pungue River, blocking road communications to Beira, and periodically mined the railroad lines linking that port city to Zimbabwe. On December 9, 1982, they blew up 34 oil storage tanks in Beira valued at more than \$40 million. This caused severe shortages in Zimbabwe.¹⁹

¹⁴Quoted in Colin Legum, "The Counterrevolutionaries in Mozambique: The Challenge of the Mozambique National Resistance," *Third World Reports* (March, 1983), p. 13.

¹⁵Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RNM), "Relatório Referente a Sessão do Trabalho de R.N.M. e do Representativo do Governo Sul Africano Afonso Macache Maresta Dhlakama," October 25, 1980. This is one of a number of captured MNR documents used for this article. Western intelligence considers them to be authentic.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷FRELIMO's campaign against polygamy, brideprice, female rites of initiation and other customs that either exploited women or reproduced "obscurantism" was bitterly opposed by a number of chiefs and male elders. The MNR was able to appeal to this dissatisfaction with some success.

¹⁸*Washington Post*, August 6, 1983.

¹⁹*Financial Times*, January 6, 1983; *Observer* (London), February 20, 1983; *Washington Post*, January 7, 1983.

While South Africa intensified its military pressure, it expanded its political objectives. Fearing both the increasing popularity of the African National Congress (ANC) and the liberation movement's ability to attack strategic points inside South Africa, Pretoria embarked on a campaign to compel Mozambique to deny sanctuary to or support for the ANC. The first indication of this policy was the 1981 attack on the homes of South African refugees, some of whom were ANC members, living on the outskirts of Maputo. More ominous was the explicit warning of South African Defense Minister Malan in August, 1982, that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique to rid it of "ANC terrorists."²⁰

By 1983, FRELIMO had concluded that peace would not be possible unless it reached some sort of accommodation with South Africa. Faced with a deteriorating military situation, the leaders were forced to acknowledge that the socialist countries were either unwilling or unable to provide the military assistance Mozambique had been led to expect. Soviet weapons—with the exception of a handful of MiG-21's, MI-24 helicopter gunships, and SAM-7's—were out-of-date and costly, a fact not lost on the Mozambicans. Moreover, there was growing dissatisfaction with the quality of the conventional military training provided by East-bloc advisers, which proved ineffectual against the MNR guerrillas. South Africa's undeclared campaign of economic strangulation, together with escalating MNR attacks, decimated Mozambique's economy. Encouraged by promises of Western economic and military support, in March, 1984, Mozambique signed an agreement with South Africa known as the Nkomati Accord. Each party promised "not to allow its territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against the other." Whatever the diplomatic and economic benefits for Mozambique, the Nkomati Accord did not end South African support for the MNR.

From the outset, Pretoria violated both the spirit and the substance of the accord. Documents captured at MNR headquarters inside Mozambique reveal that shortly before the Nkomati Accord, Pretoria provided the MNR with sufficient arms to pursue military activities for several months. An entry in one of the captured diaries noted that MNR leader Afonso

Dhlakama met "on February 23, 1984, at 10 AM in Pretoria . . . [with] the general of military intelligence." General Van der Westhuizen is quoted as reaffirming the commitment of the South African security apparatus to the MNR.²¹

The captured diaries showed that South African planes and ships violated Mozambique's airspace and territorial waters repeatedly to resupply the MNR.²² South Africa's refusal to rein in the MNR effectively undercut the Joint Security Commission set up to implement the terms of the Nkomati Accord. In October, 1985, Machel suspended his government's participation in the commission and announced that Mozambique would intensify military efforts against the MNR.

This decision, coupled with Machel's highly visible Western diplomatic offensive in the fall of 1985, posed a serious problem for the Botha regime. On the one hand, Western governments, especially President Ronald Reagan's administration, which had brokered the Nkomati Accord, exerted pressure on Pretoria not to violate the agreement. On the other hand, powerful domestic forces, including key sectors of the military and security apparatus, the right wing of the National party and the increasingly powerful Portuguese community representing 15 percent of the South African electorate, all demanded that Botha escalate support for the MNR.

One way to accommodate these potentially contradictory pressures was for South Africa to curtail some of the more visible aspects of its destabilization campaign. Pretoria's shift in strategy rested on the expanded involvement of the Malawian government which, since 1981, had periodically allowed the MNR to launch attacks across its frontier. Military bases in Malawi, adjacent to the vast border with Mozambique, provided an ideal way to resupply the MNR surreptitiously. They also offered easy access to strategic economic targets in central and northern Mozambique. The existence of a South African embassy in Malawi, moreover, facilitated the collection of intelligence information, allowing South African security to coordinate strategic military planning for the MNR.

There is clear evidence to support charges by Mozambique's chief of staff, Sebastiao Mabote, that "Malawi is helping South African-backed guerrillas materially [and] logistically."²³ Zimbabwean intelligence officers who returned from Mozambique confirm the existence of MNR bases run by South Africans in Malawi. Recently, a journalist for *The Observer* of London witnessed Malawian troops fraternizing with MNR forces at the frontier post of Muloza. The Malawian commander was quite candid: "We are with them all the time and we help them against FRELIMO."²⁴

On the face of it, Malawian support for the MNR would seem inexplicable. Not only does such a policy further isolate the Banda government from its African

²⁰Reuters, August 22, 1982.

²¹"Documentos de Gorongosa." The documents and diary were subsequently reproduced and distributed to foreign governments and journalists. Gorongosa refers to the captured MNR base where they were discovered. See also Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), pp. 36–37.

²²"Documentos de Gorongosa."

²³Author interview with Sebastião Mabote, chief of the general staff and deputy minister of defense, July 2, 1986.

²⁴*Observer*, August 24, 1986.

neighbors, but MNR attacks have disrupted Malawian commerce, which relies heavily on Mozambican ports. As a result, Malawian businessmen have had to use more costly transport routes via South Africa and Tanzania.

Despite his government's repeated public denials, there are several possible explanations for Banda's policies. Some observers suggest that because of close economic and security ties to Pretoria, Malawi's President for life may simply be closing his eyes and giving Pretoria a free hand. Others point to Banda's long-standing claim to much of northern Mozambique, which, he maintains, was historically part of a greater Malawian empire. Control over this territory would give landlocked Malawi direct access to the Indian Ocean. In the early 1960's, Banda proposed to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere that the two countries divide northern Mozambique. Banda subsequently aided a tiny separatist movement—União Nacional Africana de Rombezia—as part of a plan to integrate northern Mozambique into a greater Malawi.²⁵

Whatever Banda's motives, escalating MNR attacks from Malawi in the first half of 1985 led to a deterioration in the security situation in central and northern Mozambique. At an urgent meeting in June, 1985, the leaders of Tanzania and Zimbabwe promised to increase their military support for Machel's government. Tanzania, whose own resources are limited, agreed to train Mozambican recruits fighting in the three northern provinces. For their part, Zimbabwean officials, who now privately acknowledge "that they had not taken the MNR threat seriously enough," have moved to rectify this situation. Since 1984, Zimbabwe has dramatically increased its military support for Mozambique. The number of its soldiers deployed in that war-torn country and providing logistical backup from Zimbabwe have tripled to more than 12,000. Most of these forces are used to protect the corridor connecting Harare with the Indian Ocean port of Beira and strategic areas in the Zambezi Valley.

Despite this military assistance, the cumulative effects of the cycle of destruction and terrorism unleashed by Pretoria have been devastating. Between 1983 and 1985, MNR attacks were responsible for the closing of more than 1,800 schools and the displacement of 313,000 students, crippling the government's rural education and literacy programs. In 1985, MNR activity was responsible for the destruction of more

than 900 stores in the countryside. A July, 1986, report of the Ministry of Agriculture revealed that production plummeted over the preceding three years and that the economy was on the verge of collapse.

From the moment Chissano assumed power, he made it clear that he would continue his predecessor's domestic and foreign policies and broad socialist agenda. Given the deteriorating situation and his limited options, the new leader has little space in which to maneuver.

The economy has been battered. Between 1982 and 1985, the gross domestic product declined by one-third and industrial and agricultural production by one-half and Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings plummeted to a mere \$180 million. (Exports in 1986 were a meager \$82 million.) Mozambique's foreign debt is now \$3 billion and its debt service ratio is 170 percent, which means that even if it used all its 1986 earned foreign exchange, it could not meet its debt obligation for the year.²⁶

Chissano will probably pursue a policy of austerity while trying to provide incentives to stimulate agriculture and revitalize industry through a series of loans estimated at \$120 million from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).²⁷ To secure such loans, however, in January, 1987, the government was forced to impose a 420 percent devaluation of Mozambican currency and to increase substantially the prices of basic consumer goods and services.²⁸ Both measures will create new hardships and, as the recent example of Zambia suggests, a potentially volatile situation. Moreover, with more than 40 percent of the budget allocated to national defense and billions of dollars of infrastructure destroyed by Rhodesian, South African and MNR attacks, Chissano's government will have to depend on a substantial infusion of aid and foreign investment to revive the economy. Neither source of assistance is likely to be forthcoming on an appreciable scale as long as the countryside remains in turmoil.

Chissano is also likely to continue Machel's efforts to forge an autonomous nonaligned policy. This implies expanding his country's ties to the West while seeking to sustain improved relations with the Soviet Union. Under Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has increased economic and military aid to Mozambique. However, most foreign policy analysts remain skeptical that Mozambique's non-aligned strategy will generate the level of assistance Mozambique requires and it may very well alienate one or both of the superpowers. Indeed, United States economic assistance has steadily dropped, from \$30 million in fiscal 1986 to \$18 million in fiscal 1987, and the Reagan administration is asking for only \$11.6 million for the forthcoming year.²⁹

In the final analysis, the security crisis poses the most immediate and serious challenge for Chissano,

²⁵Johnson and Martin, eds., op. cit., pp. 23–24.

²⁶Gillian Gunn, "Mozambique After Machel," *CSIS Africa Notes*, vol. 67 (1986), p. 3; Johnson and Martin, eds., op. cit., p. 30; Comissão Nacional do Plano, Direcção Nacional de Estatística, *Informação Estatística, 1975–1984* (Maputo: Comissão Nacional do Plano, 1986).

²⁷*Guardian*, January 17, 1987; Mozambique Information Office, *News Review*, vol. 98 (1987), p. 5.

²⁸*News Review*, p. 2.

²⁹*Washington Post*, February 15, 1987.

as it did for Machel. The new President devoted almost a quarter of his December inaugural address to this issue and, as he had in the past, took an intransigent position toward the South African-backed MNR. At the same time, he held out an olive branch to the Banda government, emphasizing that "we want to develop relations of friendship and cooperation with the brother people of Malawi," but he noted that "these relations are seriously affected by the support that the bandits have received from Malawian territory."³⁰

In the short run, Chissano can count on increased military assistance from Zimbabwe. Minister of State for Security Emmerson Munangagwa predicted a sharp increase in military activity in order to blunt the MNR offensive and guarantee the smooth functioning of the Beira Corridor, which "is so important that we will keep it open at any cost." Completion of the corridor, a four-year, \$280-million project funded primarily by the Netherlands and Sweden, will triple the port of Beira's handling capacity to 3.5 million tons. This, in turn, would free Zimbabwe and the other front-line states from their dependence on South African ports and railroads.

Reports from Zimbabwe indicate that Robert Mugabe's government is already preparing to increase the number of troops fighting in Mozambique in order to dislodge the rebels from regions adjacent to the corridor. A joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean offensive at the end of 1986 managed to blunt the MNR advances in Zambezia and prevent them from establishing effective control over the country's richest and most populated province.

While increased Zimbabwean assistance may provide the new government with some breathing space, in the long run Chissano must accelerate Machel's efforts to upgrade the poorly trained and equipped army. There is ample evidence from successful battalions in Inhambane and Gaza, as well as those guarding the Lonrho cotton plantations at Montechoeira, that government soldiers who have received proper training, adequate supplies and logistical support, have held their own against the MNR.

A number of small steps have already been taken to rectify this situation. According to Mozambican officials, negotiations have been completed with a British firm to arm and train an elite force of several hundred troops. Armed with advanced British rifles and backed by helicopters and sophisticated ground-to-air communications systems, these soldiers will be used to protect the strategic Nacala railroad line.

Other Mozambican troops are being trained by ex-British secret service experts at Manhica north of Maputo; 240 officers recently completed a course directed by British instructors at a military base in

eastern Zimbabwe; and about 480 officers will be trained in 1987.³¹ In addition, Zimbabwe has offered to provide rudimentary training for several thousand Mozambican troops.

But training and war material are not enough. Senior Mozambican officials as well as Zimbabwean officers contend privately that if the army is to be transformed into an efficient fighting force, a major overhaul in the logistics and command structure is necessary. They stress that this is a long and difficult process. Before his death, Machel, who had taken personal command of the army in July, was planning to retire some of the senior officers who fought in the armed struggle and replace them with better trained, younger commanders. Mozambican sources predict that Chissano will pursue this policy. He will probably shift civilians who have demonstrated good management skills into key logistical positions in the army. While he consolidates his power, however, the President may have to move more slowly than strategic conditions necessitate.

But time is not necessarily on his side. Until now there has been little evidence that the MNR has been able to build any meaningful social base in the countryside, and there are deep splits within the MNR.³² While the MNR could take on a life of its own, its lack of a program or base of popular support and its dependence on Pretoria and former Portuguese colonialists make this highly unlikely. It remains, however, a powerful weapon in South Africa's destabilization arsenal, and, unless it is contained, it could destroy the very fabric of Mozambican society. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 221)

distills the major issues and events in sub-Saharan Africa since independence. This is an excellent introduction to and critical commentary on the problems facing Africa in the 1980's. W.W.F.

DICTIONARY OF AFRICAN HISTORICAL BIOGRAPHY. 2d ed. By Mark R. Lipschutz and R. Kent Rasmussen. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 326 pages, maps, bibliography and index, \$40.00.)

This useful reference work describes a wide cross section of African personalities. The entries are succinct and provide essential data for those requiring quick reference. Post-1960 political leaders are listed in a supplement. W.W.F.

ALSO RECEIVED ON AFRICA

BEYOND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA. Edited by Elliot P. Skinner. (New York: Paragon House, 1986. 282 pages, notes and index, \$21.95, cloth; \$10.95, paper.) ■

³⁰*Tempo* (Lisbon), vol. 844 (1986), pp. 6-9.

³¹*Business Day*, January 12, 1987.

³²See for example the *Washington Times*, August 20, 1986.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1987, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Aegean Crisis

March 27—Greece orders the temporary closing of a U.S. Navy base and puts its military forces on alert to protest Turkey's decision to send a seismic vessel into waters claimed by Greece; Turkey puts its forces on alert.

March 28—Under pressure from the U.S., Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal orders the Turkish seismic vessel to stay out of the disputed waters; Greece withdraws its demand that the U.S. naval base be closed.

Arms Control

March 3—At the resumption of Soviet-American arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet delegation officially presents Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

March 4—The Soviet delegation offers to allow on-site inspection to verify the removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The U.S. presents a 40-page draft treaty, a "full treaty text," on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

March 16—In Geneva, U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear testing resume.

March 26—Talks on intermediate-range missiles recess until April 23.

European Economic Community (EEC)

March 4—The European Commission, the body that administers the daily affairs of the European Community (EC), says the EC is nearly bankrupt because EC members have not paid their share of the budget.

March 17—The Community posts the first trade surplus in the organization's history; the \$6-billion surplus resulted from lower oil and raw materials prices.

Iran-Iraq War

March 1—Iran claims that its troops have defeated a large Iraqi force southeast of Basra in the last 2 days.

United Nations (UN)

March 19—Spokesman François Giuliani says that the UN will not open its files on Nazi war criminals to the public; Israel has requested that the files be opened.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *Pakistan*)

March 25—Afghan planes bomb guerrilla camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border; at least 80 people are killed. Some bombs fall on Pakistani and Iranian territory.

ANGOLA

March 26—In Washington, D.C., the U.S. office of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) says UNITA will allow the Benguela railroad line to be reopened; the railroad links the Angolan port of Lobito with several landlocked black-ruled states.

BRAZIL

March 17—Planning Minister João Sayad resigns.

CHAD

March 22—The government says that its troops have captured Wadi Doum, which formerly provided Libya with an airbase in northern Chad.

March 27—The government says its troops have recaptured Fayà-Largeau after Libyan forces occupying the city fled.

CHILE

March 11—President Augusto Pinochet signs a law allowing Chileans to form non-Communist political parties; political parties have been illegal for the last 13 years of military rule.

March 18—In Santiago, the 1st opposition newspaper to publish in 13 years goes on sale.

CHINA

(See also *Vietnam*)

March 2—Deputy Prime Minister Li Peng reassures visiting U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz that "China finds no reasons to change its policies of [economic] reform."

March 14—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang says that the party's campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" will continue for "the next dozens of years."

March 23—In Beijing, negotiators for China and Portugal announce that the Portuguese colony of Macao will be returned to China in 1999; Portugal has held Macao for 430 years.

March 25—In a speech before the National People's Congress, Zhao acknowledges economic problems but says the economic reform program will continue; he condemns "pernicious" Western influences on the country's culture.

March 26—The 1987 budget is presented to the National People's Congress; the budget calls for a 10 percent increase in spending and projects a \$2.2-billion deficit; the government will also impose stronger controls on investment in new industries.

March 28—The government announces that a party congress will be held in September; a new party leader will be chosen at that time.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

March 11—A court in Prague convicts 5 men of "unauthorized" publishing of books and newsletters in support of a jazz music society; the 5 are given short jail sentences.

ECUADOR

March 13—President León Febres Cordero says Ecuador is suspending payment on its \$8.3-billion foreign debt for the rest of 1987; Ecuador has been hit by two earthquakes in the last 7 days, which have halted the oil exports required to pay the foreign debt.

EL SALVADOR

March 31—Leftist guerrillas attack an army base at El Paraíso, killing 43 soldiers and 1 U.S. Special Forces adviser; the adviser, Staff Sergeant Gregory Fronius, is the 1st U.S. serviceman to be killed in combat in El Salvador.

FINLAND

March 6—Results from today's parliamentary elections show that the ruling Social Democratic party has lost support to the Conservative party; however, the Social Democrats still hold more seats, 56, to the Conservatives' 53.

FRANCE

- March 10—Finance Minister Edouard Balladur announces that foreign banks and brokerage firms will be allowed to purchase capital in any French stock company, beginning in 1988.
- March 25—The Interior Ministry arrests 8 Arabs for terrorist bombings in France; the 8 tell officials that they have links with Iran's secret service and the pro-Iranian Party of God in Lebanon.
- March 31—Prime Minister Jacques Chirac meets in Washington, D.C., with U.S. President Ronald Reagan to discuss the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

GERMANY, WEST

- March 11—Helmut Kohl is reelected Chancellor by the Parliament.
- March 23—Former Chancellor Willy Brandt resigns as head of the Social Democratic party; party members nominate Hans-Jochen Vogel to take Brandt's place.

GREECE

(See also *Intl, Aegean Crisis*)

- March 7—Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu threatens to close a Voice of America relay station unless the U.S. ends its "favoritism" toward Turkey.

HAITI

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 5—In Grasse, France, Haitian officials file suit against former Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier, seeking \$120 million he allegedly embezzled.
- March 29—Haitians vote in a referendum on a proposed constitution.

HONDURAS

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 10—Government planes shoot down an unarmed C-47 transport plane, killing the American pilot and 3 others; the government says the plane was smuggling drugs from Colombia.

HUNGARY

- March 15—Almost 1,500 people in Budapest hold a march to call for liberalization; the government allows the march to conclude peacefully.

INDIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 21—In Madras, police arrest the head of an Indian Tamil separatist group who, they say, is responsible for the bombing of a railroad bridge that killed 25 people.
- March 24—An unmanned Indian rocket carrying a satellite crashes into the Bay of Bengal after liftoff; this is India's 3d rocket failure in its last 5 attempts.
- March 25—Results from the March 23 state elections show that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) party was defeated in Kerala and West Bengal, but won in Kashmir.
- March 28—Law Minister Ashoke Kumar Sen resigns to protest the Congress party's poor showing in state elections.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; France; Tunisia*)

- March 10—Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur says he has been given assurances by Syrian President Hafez Assad that Syrian troops in Lebanon will not disarm Muslim militiamen loyal to Iran.

March 23—Government radio in Teheran reports that Terry Waite, a special envoy for the Anglican Church's Archbishop of Canterbury, is being held by a pro-Iranian Shiite group in Beirut; Waite has been missing since January 20; the group holding him says it regards Waite as a U.S. spy.

IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; Turkey*)

- March 2—Western bankers sign an agreement with Iraq that will allow Iraq to defer payment on \$500 million in foreign loans; Iraq's total foreign debt is estimated at \$50 billion.

IRELAND

- March 10—Charles Haughey is narrowly elected Prime Minister; an 82-82 parliamentary tie on the nomination was broken by Speaker Sean Tracy.
- March 21—Alan Dukes is named head of the Fine Gael party; former Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald resigned as head of the party on March 11.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, UN; Syria; U.S., Administration, Foreign Policy*)

- March 10—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir says that the life sentence imposed on Jonathan Jay Pollard, an American convicted of spying for Israel, is not a concern of Israel's; the Israeli government has denied any connection with Pollard, who said during his trial that he was working for the Israeli government.
- March 11—The Cabinet appoints a 2-member commission to investigate possible government involvement in the Pollard spy case; Prime Minister Shamir opposes any investigation.
- March 19—The Parliament approves a Cabinet decision to end new military sales to South Africa; however, existing contracts for arms may continue.
- March 24—Foreign Minister Shimon Peres meets with 15 Palestinians from the occupied West Bank to discuss the selection of Palestinian representatives for direct peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
- Prime Minister Shamir rejects a proposal by Lebanese Shiite terrorists to trade a dying American hostage for 100 Arab prisoners held in Israeli jails.
- March 29—Colonel Aviem Sella, an Israeli air force officer indicted on March 3 by a U.S. grand jury on espionage charges, says he will not accept a recent promotion to head the Tel Nof air base.
- Prime Minister Shamir is elected head of the Herut party.

ITALY

- March 3—Prime Minister Bettino Craxi resigns.
- March 9—President Francesco Cossiga names Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti (a Christian Democrat) as Prime Minister-designate and asks him to form a new government; the Socialist party criticizes the appointment.
- March 20—The Union of Fighting Communists claims responsibility for the killing of air force General Licio Giorgieri today in Rome.
- March 27—President Cossiga appoints Nilde Iotti to mediate the choice of a new Prime Minister; Iotti, a member of the Italian Communist party, is head of the Chamber of Deputies. Andreotti gave up his attempt to form a government on March 25.

JAPAN(See also *U.S., Economy, Foreign Policy*)

March 17—The Economic Planning Agency reports that the economy grew 2.5 percent in 1986, a sharp decrease from the 4.7 percent growth rate in 1985. The agency says the decline was the worst since 1974.

March 19—A consortium of 28 Japanese banks announces that it has formed a company, JBA Investments, that will buy at a discount the banks' \$60 billion in outstanding loans to Latin America.

March 23—Masaji Yamamoto, the deputy director general of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's machine and information industry department, reports that the government has asked Japanese semiconductor producers to cut back semiconductor chip production by 11 percent in the next 2 months; in the last month the U.S. has charged Japan with "dumping" and has threatened to impose sanctions against Japanese chip manufacturers to protest the large Japanese semiconductor market share in the U.S.

March 27—The Finance Ministry says Japan's February trade surplus was a record \$8.14 billion.

KAMPUCHEA(See *Thailand; Vietnam*)**KENYA**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 19—A nationwide roundup of illegal aliens begins; President Daniel arap Moi ordered the aliens' arrest and expulsion on his return from the U.S. and Great Britain on March 17, saying that the aliens were troublemakers.

KOREA, SOUTH

March 3—Riot police stop an anti-government march staged by the opposition New Korea Democratic party; the tens of thousands of marchers are routed with tear gas.

March 6—President Chun Doo Hwan reportedly tells visiting U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz that he plans to hold free elections and leave office by February, 1988.

KUWAIT(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**LAOS**(See also *Thailand*)

March 8—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrives for talks; he will also visit Kampuchea and Vietnam.

LEBANON(See also *Iran; Israel*)

March 1—Syrian troops patrolling Beirut supervise the shipment of 40 tons of food to 2 Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut; the camps have been without food for several weeks because of a siege by the Shiite Amal militia.

March 18—The Revolutionary Justice Organization, a Shiite group, releases a Saudi diplomat who has been held hostage by the group for 66 days.

LIBERIA

March 4—The U.S. State Department says Liberia has agreed to allow the U.S. to send 17 financial experts to Liberia to manage the country's economy; Liberia had to accept the offer in order to receive U.S. economic assistance this year.

LIBYA(See also *Chad*)

March 27—After 5 days of talks in Tripoli, members of 5 splinter Palestinian guerrilla groups issue a statement calling for the resignation of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat and the continuation of armed struggle.

NICARAGUA(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

March 9—Arturo Cruz resigns from the leadership of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), the political wing of the U.S.-backed anti-government resistance (contras); a former Sandinista and a political moderate, Cruz says he is resigning because changes he wanted to institute in the contras' leadership and organization were blocked.

March 23—Fernando Chamorro, the head of 1 of the UNO factions, says he is quitting UNO because a "clique" has seized control of the group.

PAKISTAN(See also *Afghanistan*)

March 8—Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani says that Pakistan will continue to develop nuclear energy regardless of international (especially U.S.) criticism; on March 1, a Pakistani nuclear scientist said Pakistan was working on a nuclear weapon; he later denied the remark.

March 23—The government says that Afghan warplanes today bombed the Pakistani border village of Tera Mangal, killing 51 people and wounding 105; the village is in an Afghan guerrilla supply area.

March 30—Two Pakistani jets shoot down an Afghan air force jet that was flying near Tera Mangal.

PERU

March 17—The government says it will sell 40 state-owned companies that have drained the government's finances.

PHILIPPINES

March 18—A bomb explodes at the Philippine Military Academy, killing 4 people.

March 22—In an address at the Philippine Military Academy, President Corazon Aquino says that the "answer to terrorism on the left and the right is not social . . . reform but police and military action." She says her attempts to gain guerrilla confidence through negotiations have failed.

March 23—An army captain is arrested in connection with the military academy bombing.

March 27—The government restructures an agreement with private Western banks to restructure its \$13.2-billion foreign debt; the 17-year agreement will allow the Philippines to pay some of the interest on its foreign debt in the form of notes rather than cash.

POLAND

March 28—The government announces price increases on basic foodstuffs, gasoline and other consumer goods; the increases range from 10 to 100 percent.

PORTUGAL(See *China*)**SIERRA LEONE**

March 23—The government reports that it has crushed a coup attempt against President Joseph Momoh; 1 person was reported killed in the attempt, which was mounted by members of the police force.

SOUTH AFRICA(See also *Israel; Sweden*)

March 21—Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu meets for the first time with leaders of the African National Congress in Lusaka, Zambia.

SWEDEN

March 12—Foreign Minister Sten Andersson announces that Sweden will impose economic sanctions against South Africa; the sanctions go into effect on July 1.

SYRIA(See also *Iran; Lebanon*)

March 8—President Hafez Assad says Syria will liberate the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights because "the Golan is Arab territory."

THAILAND

March 1—Government troops expel 230 Kampuchean and Vietnamese refugees from the Khao-I-Dang refugee camp near the Kampuchean-Thai border.

March 15—Government troops begin the forced repatriation of Laotian refugees living in the Ban Vinai refugee camp.

TUNISIA

March 26—The government announces that it is breaking diplomatic relations with Iran because it believes Iran supports a Tunisian Muslim fundamentalist group.

TURKEY(See also *Intl, Aegean Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 4—Military officials in Ankara confirm that Turkish jets bombed Kurdish rebel sites in northern Iraq today, killing 100 people. The attacks are a retaliation for recent Kurdish rebel attacks on Turkish villages.

March 18—U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger ends his trip to Turkey; he says he hopes the U.S. Congress will restore the large cuts it has made in military and economic aid to Turkey.

U.S.S.R.(See also *Intl, Arms Control; Laos; UK, Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy, Military*)

March 5—A Foreign Ministry spokesman says there are no plans to allow the publication of Nobel Prize winner Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's novel *Cancer Ward*; reports that excerpts will be published are wrong, he says.

March 18—The Communist party newspaper *Pravda* reports the dismissal of Viktor Boiko, the party first secretary for the Dnepropetrovsk region in the Ukraine.

March 26—The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency release a report on the Soviet economy that says the economy grew by 4.2 percent in 1986.

The government news agency Tass reports the 1st bankruptcy in Soviet history; a state-run Leningrad construction firm has been closed because of cost overruns and substandard work.

March 31—Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov says he told visiting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that the West should support Gorbachev's liberalization policies; the noted dissident says he "wholeheartedly" supports the changes Gorbachev has initiated.

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**(See also *Iran*)

March 17—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government issues a new budget that will cut personal income tax rates by 2 percent; the cuts will go into effect in May.

March 28—Thatcher arrives in Moscow for meetings with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

UNITED STATES**Administration**

March 2—The Internal Revenue Service introduces a new, supposedly simpler W-4 withholding form that will be distributed in April; taxpayers may use either the long or short W-4 form.

March 3—President Ronald Reagan nominates Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director William H. Webster to be the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In Washington, D.C., a federal grand jury indicts Israeli air force officer Aviem Sella on espionage charges; Sella, who is in Israel and cannot be extradited for trial, is charged with conspiring with U.S. Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard.

March 4—In U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., Pollard is sentenced to a life term in prison for spying for Israel; Pollard's wife Anne is sentenced to 2 concurrent 5-year prison terms for her part in the espionage.

March 12—President Reagan names Kenneth M. Duberstein as chief deputy to White House chief of staff Howard Baker Jr.

March 16—Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert Windom releases a plan to give the public information to prevent the spread of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS); the plan allows local communities and school boards to decide what their AIDS education programs should include.

March 18—Director of the Federal Aviation Administration Donald Egan announces his resignation, effective in July.

March 20—The Federal Drug Administration approves the use of the drug azidothymidine (AZT) for AIDS victims; AZT may prolong the life of some AIDS victims but it is not a cure.

March 23—The Interior Department proposes the threefold expansion of coastal areas included in the National Coastal Barrier System to protect ecological areas.

March 24—The Immigration and Naturalization Service says it plans to extend from June 1 to September 1 the period in which employers may continue to employ illegal aliens, provided such aliens offer assurances that they expect to attain legal status under the new immigration law.

March 30—Alicia Coro, an Education Department administrator, says branches in several cities have backdated records of civil rights complaints in order to meet deadlines on investigating and correcting the alleged abuses.

President Reagan appoints T. Kenneth Crib as an assistant to the President and adviser on domestic affairs.

March 31—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shuts down the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, saying that the plant's control operators have been guilty of "pervasive" sleeping on duty.

Economy

March 3—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators declined 1.0 percent in January.

March 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate remained unchanged at 6.6 percent in February.

March 13—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.1 percent in February.

March 17—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for the last quarter of 1986 rose to \$36.84 billion; the deficit for all 1986 was \$140.57 billion.

March 18—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) rose at an annual rate of 1.1 percent in the last quarter of 1986; the revised

report calculates the GNP growth rate for all 1986 at 2.5 percent.

March 24—The dollar reaches a 35-year low against the Japanese yen, reaching 149.30 yen to the dollar. The U.S. Federal Reserve and other countries' central banks reportedly intervene to halt the dollar's downward slide.

March 26—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones Industrial Average of 30 blue-chip stocks closes at a new record high of 2,372.59.

March 27—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in February.

March 29—The dollar falls to a record low of 144.70 yen to the dollar in Tokyo before closing at 145.35 yen to the dollar.

March 30—The U.S. Federal Reserve buys \$2 billion in U.S. currency to try to stem the decline of the dollar.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average falls 57.39 points, its third largest daily point drop in history.

March 31—Citibank of New York and Chase Manhattan Bank raise their prime rate from 7.5 percent to 7.75 percent, the first increase in a prime rate since June, 1984.

The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.7 percent in February.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Aegean Crisis, Arms Control; China; El Salvador; France; Greece; Israel; Japan; Korea, South; Liberia; Pakistan; Turkey*)

March 3—President Reagan says that U.S. arms control negotiators in Geneva will offer a new draft treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

March 6—National security adviser Frank Carlucci says that Secretary of State George Shultz will go to Moscow on April 13 to confer with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

March 7—Secretary Shultz returns to the U.S. from his Asian trip, which included conferences in China, South Korea and Japan, among other countries.

March 9—Six former defense secretaries urge the Reagan administration to continue to observe the restrictions in the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union.

March 11—Secretary Shultz calls Israeli involvement in the Pollard espionage case "very disheartening."

March 12—Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi meets with President Reagan in Washington, D.C.; he urges the U.S. to make "a deeper commitment" to end South Africa's apartheid policies.

March 16—In Washington, D.C., Secretary Shultz and Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu sign a new Turkish-U.S. defense agreement granting the U.S. rights to military bases in Turkey through 1990; the agreement includes over \$700 million in U.S. military and economic assistance to Turkey for 1987.

March 18—*The New York Times* reports that the CIA is providing the Nicaraguan contras with precise information about possible targets inside Nicaragua.

March 19—President Reagan signs an executive order freezing the assets in the U.S. of former Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier and his family.

March 21—Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth resigns his post.

The Defense Department announces that some 50,000 U.S. troops will take part in exercises in Honduras in May.

March 23—U.S. deputy delegate to the UN Herbert Okun says that the Soviet Union is complying with an order to reduce the size of its UN mission and "has assured us that they are in compliance with the limits established for April 1."

The State Department reports that at the request of

Kuwait, the U.S. has offered naval protection to Kuwaiti ships in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait, which fears Iranian attacks on its shipping, has not yet accepted the offer.

March 26—Administration officials report that the U.S. told India last week that it will allow India to buy an older model supercomputer from the U.S.; this is the 1st time the U.S. has sold a supercomputer to a nation with close military ties to the Soviet Union.

March 27—The White House publishes a list of 19 Japanese electronic products being considered for a possible 100 percent tariff increase on April 17; this is the U.S. response to Japan's failure to comply with last July's agreement between the U.S. and Japan on semiconductors, which the U.S. claims are being dumped on U.S. markets.

Labor and Industry

March 9—The Chrysler Corporation announces that it will purchase American Motors from American Motors Corporation and the French Renault company, which holds 46 percent of AMC shares; the purchase price will be about \$1.5 billion.

March 13—Fairchild Industries and the U.S. Air Force announce the cancellation of a contract for T-46A training planes.

March 19—Boyd Jeffries, the chief executive of Jeffries and Company of Los Angeles, pleads guilty to 2 felony counts of helping to raise some stock prices artificially and creating bogus stock transfers to help convicted arbitrageur Ivan Boesky evade minimum financial requirements.

March 26—The government sells its 85 percent holding of Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) stock to private investors for \$1.65 billion; the remaining 15 percent of Conrail's stock is owned by Conrail employees.

Legislation

March 11—The House votes 230 to 196 to suspend \$40 million in aid payments to the Nicaraguan contras until money provided earlier by both Congress and others is completely accounted for.

March 18—The Senate votes 52 to 48 not to block the \$40 million in aid to the contras.

President Reagan signs a joint resolution restored by Congress on March 15 that will provide \$47.5 million for asbestos cleanup in the nation's schools.

March 20—The Senate votes 79 to 17 to pass an \$87.9-billion 5-year mass transit and highway bill; the bill also allows states to raise the speed limits on rural interstate highways from the present 55-mile-an-hour limit to 65 miles per hour; yesterday the House voted 407 to 17 to approve the bill.

March 27—President Reagan vetoes the \$87.9-billion highway and mass transit bill.

March 31—The House votes 350 to 73 to override President Reagan's veto of the highway and mass transit bill.

Military

March 3—Former national security adviser Vice Admiral John Poindexter reverts to the rank of rear admiral.

March 27—The U.S. Marine Corps charges Sergeant Clayton Lonetree and Corporal Arnold Bracey, guards at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, with giving Soviet agents access to sensitive sections of the embassy on "numerous occasions" during the past year.

March 30—At the State Department's request, the Marine Corps agrees to withdraw all 28 of its embassy guards from the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

Political Scandal

March 4—In a televised speech, President Reagan admits that what he called his "strategic initiative" toward Iran "deteriorated in its implementation into trading arms for

hostages." He accepts "full responsibility" and says that "it was a mistake."

March 5—Secretary of State Shultz says that his actions in the Iran arms deal "were not designed to make a record to protect myself," despite charges made last month by the Tower commission, President Reagan's special review board on the Iran arms sale.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger calls the Tower commission criticism of his actions "totally unsupported by any evidence."

March 12—With regard to the lawsuits filed by former National Security Council aide Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North challenging the constitutionality of the provision of the Ethics in Government Act permitting a special prosecutor to investigate the Iran arms deal, U.S. district court Judge Barrington Parker says that "the court need not and should not hear plaintiff's challenges at this time"; the "nation demands an expeditious and complete disclosure of our government's involvement in the Iran-contra affair."

March 14—In his weekly radio address, President Reagan says he did not agree with the advice of Shultz and Weinberger about the Iran arms deal, but "as we now know, it turned out they were right and I was wrong."

March 17—A 3-member panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rules that former White House deputy chief of staff Michael Deaver's challenge to the constitutionality of the special prosecutor law is an "impermissible preemptive civil challenge to a criminal proceeding"; the court lifts an emergency injunction blocking Deaver's indictment. The ruling is immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.

Invoking the 5th Amendment, John Poindexter refuses to testify before a congressional subcommittee on an administration policy (rescinded today) to tighten controls on the storage and release of government-produced data either stored in computers or transmitted electronically.

March 18—A federal grand jury indicts Michael Deaver on 5 counts of perjury under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act.

Senate and House committees investigating the Iran arms deal agree to hold joint sessions and to consider a timetable for granting limited immunity from prosecution to 2 key witnesses.

March 19—CIA officials Richard Kerr and Graham Fuller say that, in 1985, the CIA told the White House that the chance of improving U.S.-Iran relations was negligible and that there was no imminent danger of increased Soviet influence in Iran.

In a televised news conference, President Reagan says, "I would not go down that road again," in discussing his Iran policy. The President denies any knowledge of the diversion of Iranian arms sales money to the Nicaraguan contras.

In a unanimous vote, the Senate begins contempt proceedings against retired Air Force General Richard Secord for refusing to release bank records to the Senate committee investigating arms sales to Iran.

March 20—President Reagan says that Vice President George Bush "expressed certain reservations" about the Iran arms deal to key White House officials; yesterday the President indicated that Bush had supported the deal.

March 26—In U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., Michael Deaver pleads not guilty to perjury charges; his trial is set for June 8.

Politics

March 10—Former Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt declares his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1988.

March 16—Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis says he is running for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination.

March 24—Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. officially announces his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1988.

Science and Space

March 26—A National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Atlas-Centaur rocket carrying an \$83-million U.S. Navy communications satellite is destroyed 51 seconds after launch because control of the rocket was lost.

Supreme Court

March 3—The Court rules 7 to 2 that a 1973 federal law protecting the handicapped applies to those suffering from contagious diseases that are not easily transmitted.

March 9—Ruling 6 to 3, the Court upholds a lower court decision and overrules the administration's position that to qualify for asylum aliens "must prove a clear probability" of death, persecution or torture if they return home. The Court says this position is contrary to the intention of the Refugee Act of 1980, which allows refuge for aliens not wanting to return home "because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

March 24—In a 5-4 decision, the Court upholds a lower court ruling that states may require companies to comply with reasonable state environmental regulations even though such companies are engaged in U.S.-approved mining operations on U.S. forest lands.

March 25—In a 6-3 decision, the Court confirms a lower court decision upholding an affirmative action plan for women and minority groups in Santa Clara County, California; the county promoted a woman over a slightly better-qualified man. The Supreme Court decision approves affirmative action hiring and promotion in some instances even though there has been no past discrimination.

VATICAN

March 10—The Roman Catholic Church issues a doctrinal statement condemning artificial fertilization and a host of other technologies that deal with conception and birth, including amniocentesis, ultrasound testing and surrogate motherhood.

March 31—Pope John Paul II begins a 2-week tour of South America. He tells reporters that the Church should work to institute democratic change in Chile.

VENEZUELA

March 19—Police break up a student demonstration in Caracas; the students are protesting stricter entrance requirements and curriculum changes; President Jaime Lusinchi says strong police action is warranted because the student demonstrations are linked to "subversive groups."

VIETNAM

March 12—Radio Hanoi reports that the government plans to open talks on Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea with China and nonaligned Southeast Asian countries.

YUGOSLAVIA

March 24—Prime Minister Branko Mikulic says the government will not impose a wage freeze; yesterday the government rescinded price increases on consumer goods. The government's actions come after a month of widespread labor unrest to protest the economic austerity measures. ■



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